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What the Trump Administration 
Taught Us About the 
Vulnerabilities of EPA’s Science-
Based Regulatory Processes: 
Changing the Consensus 
Processes of Science into the 
Confrontational Processes of 
Law 
Bernard D. Goldstein† 
Abstract 
 Under President Trump, the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) was largely successful in at least temporarily achieving the 
administration’s policy goals. It did so, in part, by significantly altering 
or distorting the processes used under prior Republican and Democratic 
EPA leadership to obtain consensus opinion of the scientific community 
on issues pertinent to EPA’s science-based regulatory activities. In this 
article I explore the extent to which these changes reflect replacing the 
norms of science with norms more appropriate to the advocacy practices 
of law. Under the Biden Administration, we can anticipate restoration 
of the norms of science that previously guided the scientific consensus 
processes used by EPA. However, the lesson of the Trump 
administration is that these norms need buttressing by developing and 
strengthening laws that govern the selection of members of EPA’s 
external scientific and technical advisory committees, their deliberative 
processes, and the literature reviewed by EPA. 
 
 
†  Dean Emeritus of the University of Pittsburgh Graduate School of Public 
Health. From 1981–83 he was chair of EPA’s Clean Air Scientific Advisory 
Committee and subsequently served as President Reagan’s appointee as 
EPA Assistant Administrator for Research Development. He is a member 
of the National Academy of Medicine, for whom he has chaired or served 
on more than twenty committees. He has also chaired numerous 
committees related to environmental issues at the local, national, and 
international levels. He is particularly interested in the interface between 
science and law and has written on this subject in the legal and scientific 
literature. In 2015, he was a visiting professor at the University of Cologne 
Department of Political Science and European Affairs. 
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Introduction 
When teaching students or colleagues about participating in 
regulatory or other law-based proceedings, I often begin by talking 
about playing basketball while growing up in New York City. I wasn’t 
particularly good, so my playing time was mostly in pickup games at 
different local courts. While the central objective always was to score 
by putting the ball through the hoop, each court had its own subsidiary 
rules which could affect the outcome. Do you need to win by one or 
two baskets? How many times did you have to pass the ball before your 
team could score? For science-based regulatory decision making, 
scientists and policy makers have the same central objective – to use 
the best science for the most effective policies. But the subsidiary rules 
may differ for each decision process depending upon such factors as the 
legal basis for the regulation and on intra-agency practices often 
developed over decades. For street basketball, the rules could change, 
so it was important to check before you started playing. But the rules 
were always consonant with the central objective of scoring the most 
baskets. Further, it was a given that the rules would never change in 
the middle of the game. 
In this paper, I will review how the Trump administration’s EPA 
leadership attempted to, and partially succeeded, in changing the 
central objective of basing EPA’s regulatory decision-making on the 
Health Matrix·Volume 31·2021 
The Vulnerabilities of EPA's Science-Based Regulatory Process 
301 
best possible science. They did so by altering subsidiary rules on how 
this science is obtained and interpreted, in some cases blatantly in the 
midst of a regulatory decision process. 
I contend that these changes can be understood largely as altering 
the processes to approximate truth from those used by science to those 
used by law. In essence, the EPA made a move from consensus to 
confrontation. Although law and policy (and politics) differ from each 
other, throughout this article I will intentionally conflate them to focus 
on the common denominator of advocacy which is central to law, 
focusing on the area in which their overlap is most pertinent to my 
thesis of the central role of advocacy.1 I note that, of the fifteen EPA 
administrators confirmed by the U.S. Senate, nine have been lawyers.2 
Law and science are distinguished professions. Each has an 
identifiable knowledge-based core that requires advanced education. 
Each has a high level of societal recognition, responsibility and 
accountability. Each has long-standing traditions and standards that 
underlie their ethical code of conduct. For much of what they do, 
lawyers and scientists act separately. In some instances, the two 
professions work together, such as in the fields of toxic torts, forensic 
evidence, and patent law. In these areas their respective roles are 
reasonably well-defined, although subject to change.3 One activity 
 
1. Janice V. Arellano, writing the Practice Points column on the American 
Bar Association web page, points out that “Law students and new 
attorneys need to understand that the practice of law and policymaking 
are completely different areas but require the development of similar skill 
sets of quality writing, advocacy and networking.” Janice V. Arellano, 
Using Litigation Skills in the Public Policy Arena, A.B.A (Feb. 28, 2017), 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/minority-
trial-lawyer/practice/2017/using-litigation-skills-in-the-public-policy-
arena/ [https://perma.cc/65WG-9QQP]. Much scholarly work about the 
science/law and science/policy interfaces has covered the role of evidence 
and the role of advocacy. See generally Wendy E. Wagner, The “Bad 
Science” Fiction: Reclaiming the Debate Over the Role of Science in 
Public Health and Environmental Regulation, 66 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
63 (2003); SHEILA JASANOFF, THE FIFTH BRANCH: SCIENCE ADVISERS AS 
POLICYMAKERS 87 (1990) [hereinafter THE FIFTH BRANCH]; Sheila 
Jasanoff, Procedural Choices in Regulatory Science, 4 RISK 143-60 
(1993). 
2. Seven of the first eight EPA Administrators (counting Ruckelshaus twice) 
were lawyers. This was followed successively from 2001 to 2017 by five 
non-lawyers. Of the six non-lawyers, four had previously worked at EPA 
and the other two had been state governors. The two most recent EPA 
Administrators, Scott Pruitt and Andrew Wheeler, are both lawyers. 
EPA’s Administrators, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/50/epas-
administrators [https://perma.cc/Q48Y-69MX]. 
3. An example of a change is the Supreme Court’s Daubert decision that 
increased the role of judges in deciding what science can be put in front 
of a jury. See Margaret A. Berger, What has a Decade of Daubert 
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which brings scientists and lawyers in close contact is science-based 
regulation at the EPA. In this article, I will draw on significant 
experience performing and interpreting environmental health science, 
including service as President Reagan’s appointee as the EPA Assistant 
Administrator for Research and Development, and on an acquaintance 
with the law.4 Through the years I have learned much from legal 
scholars who have focused on explaining the law science interface to 
lawyers and to judges.5 But my primary approach, and bias, is that of 
a physician scientist and a toxicologist who recognizes that much of 
what is understood about health science has come from observing the 
perturbations in human biology caused by diseases and by toxic agents. 
In this article I am attempting to further the understanding of the law-
science interface by observing the perturbations caused by the Trump 
Administration, focusing particularly on the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency. 
 
Wrought? 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH S59 (2005). See infra Section II.F for 
further discussion of the Daubert decision. 
4. I am a physician who in 1966–68 served in the U.S. Public Health Service 
Division of Air Pollution prior to it being incorporated into the newly 
formed EPA. I have authored over 200 papers in the scientific literature, 
mostly on environmental topics. Relevant to the present article is my 
background in science advisory functions, at EPA and to some extent in 
law. Publications in the legal literature include co-authoring the Reference 
Guide on Toxicology in the Federal Judicial Center’s Reference Manual 
on Scientific Evidence for each of its three editions, writing a few papers 
on toxic substances and tort or regulatory law, and co-authoring a 
textbook for nonlawyers (RUSSELLYN S. CARRUTH AND BERNARD D. 
GOLDSTEIN, ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH LAW: AN INTRODUCTION (2013)). In 
toxic tort suits I have worked roughly equally for plaintiffs and defense. I 
am an elected member of both the American Society for Clinical 
Investigation and the National Academy of Medicine and have chaired 
over a dozen National Academy of Sciences committees related to 
environmental science and public health. President Reagan appointed me 
as Assistant Administrator for Research and Development, serving under 
Administrators Ruckelshaus and Thomas. I chaired the Clean Air Science 
Advisory Committee under Administrator Gorsuch, and as an academic 
have chaired or served on a variety of ad hoc EPA committees. For the 
Health Effects Institute, I chaired the Research Committee. I have chaired 
advisory committees for other federal or state agencies, the UN 
Environmental Program and the World Health Organization. More 
recently I served as a member of the Science Policy Committee of the 
Federation of American Societies of Experimental Biology. During my 
career I have served in an advisory capacity roughly equally for 
environmental NGOs and for the chemical and petrochemical industries. 
5. I particularly acknowledge Sheila Jasanoff, Wendy Wagner, Gary 
Marchant, John Applegate, Joe Cecil and David Faigman and his 
colleagues, and the late Margaret Berger who through the years have been 
willing to spend time attempting to educate a physician about the 
law/science interface. I apologize to them and to the reader for my 
misunderstandings and oversimplifications. 
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I will first look at differences between the two fields relevant to my 
thesis that replacement of EPA’s scientific consensus processes with 
those most appropriate to the law are central to understanding many 
of the actions of Trump’s EPA leadership. I will consider pertinent 
distinguishing characteristics between law and science, including the 
role of advocacy; ethical standards; metrics of success; and the 
difference between going up alleys to see if they are blind versus not 
asking a question for which you do not know the answer. I will consider 
the role of the EPA’s organizational structure in setting the tone for 
the interface between science and law, and will describe some of the 
previous attempts to perturb the consensus processes relevant to the 
scientific underpinning of governmental decision. 
These consensus approaches have in the past helped regulators 
make reasonably effective science-based rules, doing so not because 
science is necessarily good, but because such rules are inherently more 
likely to be successful in achieving the EPA’s mandated goals.6 
I will not respond to the numerous diatribes against the EPA’s 
science and scientists, some of which include recommendations to 
remove the Office and Research and Development (ORD) from the 
EPA, or to dismantle the EPA because it can’t get its science right.7 
While alterations and refinements to the processes for obtaining the 
scientific basis for regulation have been not infrequent in the past, it is 
my opinion that at no time has the EPA’s approach to understanding 
the science appropriate for regulation been subject to such drastic 
change as has occurred under the Trump administration.8 
 
6. A recent critique of EPA’s actions on air pollution repeated the pertinent 
old saw “Science without policy is science; policy without science is 
gambling.” Gretchen T. Goldman & Francesca Dominici, Don’t Abandon 
Evidence and Process On Air Pollution Policy, 363 SCIENCE 1398 (2019). 
7. See Henry I. Miller, Happy Birthday EPA?, REGULATION 4, 6 (2011), 
https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2011/
4/regv34n1-brieflynoted.pdf [https://perma.cc/5U8C-F589]. See also The 
EPA: More Trouble Than It’s Worth and Should Be Abolished, Says Dr. 
Miller, AM. COUNCIL SCI. & HEALTH (Mar. 29, 2011), 
http://www.acsh.org/factsfears/newsID.2484/news_detail.asp 
[https://perma.cc/FS4T-MG9K]. Jay Lehr of the Heartlands Institute has 
argued that EPA ought to be disbanded and its responsibilities turned 
over to states, an opinion that he says is motivated in part by EPA’s 
incredibly poor science. Jay Lehr, Foreword to RICH TRZUPEK, 
REGULATORS GONE WILD: HOW THE EPA IS RUINING AMERICAN INDUSTRY, 
at xi (2011). For an antidote to these critiques, see generally Wendy 
Wagner, It Isn’t Easy Being a Bureaucratic Expert: Celebrating the EPA’s 
Innovations, 70 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1093 (2020). 
8. In an op ed I described why I would have resigned as chairperson of 
CASAC appointed by Gorsuch, or Assistant Administrator of EPA 
appointed by Reagan, had either attempted to do what Administrator’s 
Pruitt and Wheeler have attempted. Bernard D. Goldstein, Opinion: If I 
Were Still Working at the EPA, I Would Resign, THE WASH. POST (Apr. 
2, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/if-i-were-still-
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I write from the perspective of an academic scientist. My focus will 
be on two Congressionally-mandated EPA advisory committees: the 
Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee (CASAC) and the Science 
Advisory Board (SAB).9 I generally will not consider the specifics of the 
science underlying the many EPA decisions under Scott Pruitt and 
Andrew Wheeler, which have relaxed environmental controls.10 Nor is 
the heightened involvement of stakeholders, including communities, 
which have characterized environmental health science in recent 
decades, directly pertinent to this paper.11 
I. Differences Between Science and Law Pertinent 
to Environmental Regulation 
A. The Role of Advocacy 
Central to the legal profession is advocacy for clients. Central to 
science is a belief that scientific facts speak for themselves.12 In my view 
 
working-at-the-epa-i-would-resign/2019/04/02/88e6e2b8-519a-11e9-88a1-
ed346f0ec94f_story.html [https://perma.cc/C4CZ-PWGS]. Ronald 
Reagan came to Washington with much the same anti-EPA rhetoric as 
Donald Trump and chose Anne Gorsuch as EPA Administrator. Ms. 
Gorsuch was previously considered the most anti-science of EPA’s 
Administrators. Terry Yosie & Bernard D. Goldstein, Environmental 
Science at EPA: Providing Good Science for Relevant Policy, EPA AT 50 
(A. James Barnes, John D. Graham and David Konisky, eds.), to be 
published by Rowman and Littlefield 2021. See also Bernard D. Goldstein, 
EPA at 40: Reflections on the Office of Research and Development. 21 
DUKE ENV’TL. L. AND POLICY F. 295 (2010). 
9. The Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee was established in the 1977 
Clean Air Act Amendments. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(d)(2) (1977). The EPA 
Science Advisory Board was authorized in the Environmental Research, 
Development, and Demonstration Authorization Act (ERDDAA). 42 
U.S.C. § 4365 (2018). 
10. Nadia Popovich et al., The Trump Administration Rolled Back More 
Than 100 Environmental Rules. Here’s the Full List., N.Y. TIMES (July 
15, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/climate/trump-
environment-rollbacks.html [https://perma.cc/RY86-9WMR]. 
11. See, e.g., two major advisory processes that have placed risk assessment 
within the context of stakeholder involvement: THE 
PRESIDENTIAL/CONG. COMM’N ON RISK ASSESSMENT AND RISK MGMT., 
FRAMEWORK FOR ENV’TAL HEALTH RISK MGMT. (1997), 
https://oaspub.epa.gov/eims/eimscomm.getfile?p_download_id=36372 
[https://perma.cc/XUC4-7VHA]; NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L 
ACADS., SCIENCE AND DECISIONS: ADVANCING RISK ASSESSMENT (2009). 
For a discussion of community partnerships at the National Institutes of 
Environmental Health Sciences, see Maureen Lichtveld et al., Then and 
Now: Lessons Learned from Community Academic Partnerships in 
Environmental Health Research, 15 ENV. RES. 117 (2016). 
12. Of course, these are central tendencies rather than absolute rules: 
advocacy in law is bounded by numerous constraints, and advocacy 
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the role of advocacy is the most relevant distinction between science 
and law and is central to other distinguishing factors discussed below. 
The different approaches to advocacy between law and science are 
central to the changes imposed or sought by Trump’s EPA leadership. 
One example is the difference in the way that experts are chosen to 
participate. While at the EPA I was fascinated by the confusion caused 
by the two different approaches to select scientists used by both EPA 
and its stakeholders during and subsequent to the regulatory process.13 
On most issues for which there was a reasonably large body of scientific 
information and of informed scientists, one could imagine that separate 
polling of each of the perhaps thousands of knowledgeable scientists as 
to the appropriate numerical standard would lead to a range of numbers 
that would fit a bell-shaped curve.14 The EPA’s approach, common to 
consensus processes, has been to carefully select a much smaller number 
of representative scientists with the relevant breadth and depth of 
expertise to serve on a committee to review the evidence and through 
a deliberative process make a numerical recommendation that would 
approximate the center of the bell-shaped curve. As discussed in more 
detail below, the reward structure in science leads the committee 
participants to usually, but not always, come toward a general 
agreement.15 In contrast, during the seemingly inevitable lawsuits 
resulting EPA decisions, an ethical and well-trained lawyer will look for 
individual scientists at one end of the interpretation spectrum knowing 
full well that the lawyer on the opposing side will be doing the same at 
the other end of the spectrum. The fact that an ethical, well-trained 
journalist seeks to balance their story about any controversial issue by 
quoting scientists at either end of the curve tends to reinforce the public 
impression that there are two opposing points of view rather than a 
reasonable scientific consensus somewhere in the center, or that there 
is a preponderance of scientists at one end.16 
B. Ethical Issues 
An illustration that law and science can have contrasting ethical 
obligations relevant to the role of advocacy and pertinent to public 
health regulation is the Bridgestone Tire incident. As described by New 
York Times reporter Keith Bradsher, more than 270 people are believed 
to have died in vehicle accidents caused by a specific tire product 
 
certainly occurs in science, particularly for one’s own interpretation of 
scientific findings. 
13. Bernard D. Goldstein, Risk Assessment and the Interface Between Science 
and Law, 14 COLUM. J. ENV’TL. L. 343 (1987). 
14. Id. 
15. See infra Part II, Section C and note 27 (discussing deterring factors). 
16. Climate change is an example. See infra note 32. 
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defect.17 This was known to law firms specializing in this type of product 
defect which sued the tire maker on behalf of their clients.18 The defect 
was also known to the similarly-specialized expert consultants that were 
the plaintiff’s experts in the bulk of these cases.19 However, over a five-
year period as the deaths and injuries accumulated, the defect was 
apparently not reported to the National Highway Transportation Safety 
Authority (NHTSA).20 In addition to receiving higher monetary awards 
for a non-disclosure agreement, the attorneys and consultants did not 
want to risk NHTSA making a decision that would not support their 
present and future clients.21 Dr. Martinez, a trauma physician who 
formerly headed NHTSA, is quoted as saying, “[i]t’s outrageous—I can’t 
say that enough” and ‘‘[i]f I saw something was killing my patients and 
I didn’t say anything because that would reduce the demand for my 
services, I would be putting my benefit over the benefit of my patients 
and the public, and that would clearly be unethical.’’22 But Geoffrey 
Hazard, Jr., a University of Pennsylvania Law School professor reputed 
to be an expert on legal ethics, is quoted by Bradsher as saying that 
the lawyers had not broken any laws or ethical codes: ‘‘[t]hey had a 
civic responsibility the same as you or I do, but they didn’t have a legal 
duty.’’23 
C. Metrics of Professional Success 
Success in advocacy is a major determinant of success in many, but 
not all, of the activities performed by the legal profession, whether 
 
17. Keith Bradsher, S.U.V. Tire Defects Were Known in ‘96 but Not 
Reported, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2001), https://www.nytimes.com/
2001/06/24/business/suv-tire-defects-were-known-in-96-but-not-
reported.html [https://perma.cc/73LX-K9YW]. 
18. Id. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. 
23. Id. Similarly, attempts to understand the potential impact on human 
health of unconventional shale gas drilling have been impeded by the 
signature of non-disclosure agreements as part of the settlement 
agreement between the shale gas company and those who believe their 
health has been affected. One such settlement for $750,000 was disclosed 
and widely reported. Sophia Pearson, Range Resources Paid $750,000 in 
Fracking Accord, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Mar. 21, 2013), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-03-21/range-resources-
paid-750-000-in-fracking-accord. A potential impact on scientific 
evaluation of a problem of interest to regulatory authorities is that 
individuals agreeing to non-disclosure awards, or hoping to obtain a 
significant monetary settlement, would not participate in epidemiological 
studies thereby lessening the power of such studies to detect any effect. 
Bernard D. Goldstein, Flowback, 33 THE ENV’T F. 25-29 (2016). 
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through devising successful negotiation strategies or through convincing 
judges or juries to provide favorable court decisions. Fictional or actual 
depictions of successful advocacy against the odds are well-known to 
the public, as well as to the lawyer and to the law student. If accused 
of malfeasance I am sure that we all would use effectiveness in advocacy 
as a major criterion for choice of a lawyer. Similarly, the major 
determinant of success for expert consultants is the ability to help their 
clients be successful, irrespective of the rights or wrongs of their 
scientific arguments.24 
In contrast, in academia or in public scientific organizations the 
scientist is continually aware that if their study is to be scientifically 
meaningful, or helpful to their career, other scientists must repeat or 
attempt to build upon their published study.25 If the findings of other 
scientists are not supportive, the academic’s reputation will suffer, as 
will their future success.26 Advancement in science in academia as well 
 
24. Keith A. Spencer, The Art of Scientific Deception: How Corporations Use 
“Mercenary Science” to Evade Regulation, SALON (Feb. 2, 2020), 
https://www.salon.com/2020/02/02/the-art-of-scientific-deception-how-
corporations-use-mercenary-science-to-evade-regulation/ 
[https://perma.cc/7SCY-3QTD]. 
25. For broader discussion of recognition of scientific success, see infra note 
27. 
26. Bibliometric approaches that count citation frequency to evaluate the 
success of individual scientists have been in use for decades. Journal 
Impact Factor was the first and is the simplest. It is defined as the yearly 
average number of scientific literature citations published in the last two 
years for a specific journal article. Eugene Garfield, The Clarivate 
Analytics Impact Factor, CLARIVATE, https://clarivate.com/
webofsciencegroup/essays/impact-factor/ [https://perma.cc/L6VP-
8WU8] (originally published in Current Contents, June 20, 1994). 
 Reflecting the central role of these measures in determining scientific 
merit, more complex bibliometric measures continue to be developed. See, 
e.g., Jorge E. Hirsch, An Index to Compare Scientific Research Output 
Among Similar Scientists, 102 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 1659 (2005). See 
also David van Dijk et al., Publication Metrics and Success on the 
Academic Job Market, CURRENT BIOLOGY R516, R516 (2014) (using the 
National Library of Medicine’s Pub Med to obtain data from over 25,000 
published scientists, David van Dijk and his colleagues found that journal 
impact factor is more important than total number of publications in 
becoming a principal investigator on a grant). See also Charles B. Wright 
& Nathan L. Vanderford, What Faculty Hiring Committees Want, 35 
NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 885, 886 (2017) (As another example, based on 
focused interviews of members of hiring committees for faculty in the life 
sciences, Charles B. Wright and Nathan L. Vanderford reported that 
grant funding and publication history received the highest scores for 
recruitment at all faculty levels, and that evidence of national and 
international recognition were particularly important at the level of 
associate and full professor). The news staff of the journal Nature wrote 
an article “Do Metrics Matter” based on a survey of its readers and 
selective interviews. In addition to describing the angst about 
bibliometrics, they confirmed the major role for publication in high-
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as in government science agencies, is based on an interlocking series of 
factors all of which depend heavily upon peer recognition. Success in 
publication requires convincing others in their scientific field who are 
selected by editors to peer review manuscripts. Having one’s findings 
replicated by others will lead to citation. Success in obtaining grants is 
dependent upon the judgment of peers who review grant proposals for 
funding agencies.27 Also important are indicia of national recognition 
such as being chosen to serve on scientific review committees for the 
National Academies and for other relevant organizations, including NIH 
or NSF grant review committees, and, for an environmental scientist, 
being chosen to serve on advisory committees for such organizations as 
the EPA, National Science Foundation or National Institute of 
Environmental Health Sciences (NIEHS).28 At a significant promotion 
level, the University Provost or similar decisionmaker often will 
additionally solicit letters from scientists in the field who are not 
otherwise directly associated with the candidate.29 Academic scientists 
fully recognize that those who are reviewing their work or who are 
approached for a recommendation about them may well be the ones 
 
ranking journals, citations, and grants. They also quote senior academic 
administrators about the importance of external letters. Alison Abbott et 
al., Do Metrics Matter?, 465 NATURE 860 (2010). 
27. See How Scientists Are Selected to be Members of a Chartered Review 
Group, NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH CTR FOR SCI. REV., 
https://public.csr.nih.gov/ForReviewers/BecomeAReviewer/CharteredR
eviewers [https://perma.cc/D3YE-TT9M] (note the statement that 
“expertise is the paramount consideration”). For information about NIH 
study sections that review grant applications, see Study Sections, NAT’L 
INST. OF HEALTH CTR FOR SCI. REV., https://public.csr.nih.gov/
StudySections [https://perma.cc/D3YE-TT9M]. 
28. Being chosen to serve on respected scientific committees reflects the 
ability to publish in the area of committee concern, just another of the 
interlocking metrics of success. See generally NAT’L ACADS., GETTING TO 
KNOW THE COMMITTEE PROCESS (2005), 
https://www.nationalacademies.org/_cache_5e69/content/48848857700
00079.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z498-G73T]; see also Harry P. Selker et al., 
CTSA Consortium Consensus Scientific Review Committee (SRC) 
Working Group Report on the SRC Processes, 8 CLINICAL AND 
TRANSLATIONAL SCI. 623 (2015). 
29. For the importance of external letters in promotions, see, for example, 
Robert E. Baker, Tenure and Promotion Guidelines: External Reviewer 
Qualification and Selection Process, College of Education and Human 
Development, GEO. MASON UNIV. (May, 2020), https://cehd.gmu.edu/
assets/docs/faculty/tenurepromotion/ExternalReviewerQualificationand
SelectionProcess.pdf [https://perma.cc/D97X-DYFW]. Note that the 
promotion package is not complete until the dean’s office receives at least 
as many letters from outside experts chosen by the dean as it has from 
experts recommended by the candidate. Id. Also specified is that these 
external experts must be narrowly in the same field as the candidate, thus 
highly likely to be aware of the candidate’s stature. Id. 
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who have observed their fidelity to the tenets of science while serving 
with them on any of these committees, including those for EPA. Based 
on these considerations, academic scientists are well aware that getting 
the science wrong, or being judged to be other than a dispassionate 
scientist, can have significant adverse career consequences. 
In contrast, much of the scientific consultant industry who are 
specifically hired to support an industry’s desire to lessen the impact of 
the EPA’s science-based regulatory activities performs like legal 
advocates. Their success is based on their ability to obtain and retain 
clients, which in turn is based in large part on the likelihood that they 
can devise ways to help their clients counter the scientific basis for 
EPA’s unwanted regulatory activities. 
Current EPA leadership has turned this distinction between 
academic scientists and industry consultants on its head. Based on their 
assertion that academic scientists who receive funding from EPA must 
be inherently biased in favor of EPA’s regulatory positions, Trump’s 
EPA leadership temporarily banned such scientists from serving as 
advisors.30 The EPA administrator’s office became more involved in 
advisory committee selection processes, with the result that SAB and 
CASAC academic scientists were replaced by consultants.31 
 
30. This was overturned in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District 
of New York in Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency 19cv5174 (DLC) (Feb. 20, 2020). Note 
that EPA’s funding of external scientists is through an external peer 
review process modeled largely on that of NIH, with the addition of a 
scoring by EPA staff for program relevance. Review of EPA’s external 
scientific processes by the NAS has generally been highly positive. NAT’L 
ACADEMIES OF SCIENCES, ENG’G, AND MED., A REVIEW OF THE 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY’S SCIENCE TO ACHIEVE RESULTS 
RESEARCH PROGRAM 3 (2017). 
31. An analysis by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) compared 
the source of SAB committee members at the end of the George W. Bush 
administration and two periods during the Obama administration with 
that of the Trump Administration. The first three time periods were 
remarkably similar in the source of SAB members, including having no 
one who came from the consultant industry. But the Trump 
administration decreased the number from academia by about a third, 
increased the number of industry representatives and chose five 
consultants. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-19-280, EPA 
ADVISORY COMMITTEES: IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED FOR THE MEMBER 
APPOINTMENT PROCESS (2019). See Marianne Lavelle, Trump’s EPA 
Skipped Ethics Reviews for Several New Advisers, Government Watchdog 
Group Finds, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS (July 26, 2019), 
https://insideclimatenews.org/news/16072019/gao-epa-ethics-reviews-
science-advisory-board-industry-consultants-academics-removed-trump-
pruitt/ [https://perma.cc/DXQ7-C4NZ]; Robyn Wilson, Trump’s EPA 
Replaced Scientists with Industry Advisors Under the Guise of ‘Conflicts 
of Interest,’ THE HILL (Feb. 25, 2018, 7:30 AM), https://thehill.com/
opinion/energy-environment/375308-trumps-epa-replaced-scientists-with-
industry-advisors-under-the [https://perma.cc/BCT4-SFWH]. 
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D. The Role of the Literature 
A pervasive difference between the practice of science and that of 
law is based on how practitioners have been trained to utilize the 
relevant literature. Imagine a law student about to participate in a 
moot court in which their skills as an advocate will be tested. Also 
imagine the student’s roommate, a graduate student in the sciences, is 
to present a thesis proposal. Similarities are evident. Both will be 
nervous. Their audiences will contain professors and peers whom the 
students desire to impress and who may well have some say about their 
career trajectory. Both will have been given advice about professional 
conduct, ranging from how to organize their presentations to what 
clothes to wear. Importantly, both students will have worked hard to 
master the broad literature pertinent to their specific presentations, 
whether it be relevant judicial decisions or the peer-reviewed scientific 
literature. But it is in the presentation of this literature that a 
significant difference between the training of the two students will 
become clear. 
Suppose there is a somewhat obscure published judicial decision 
potentially adverse to the position being advocated by the law student. 
While our law student must be prepared to provide a counterargument 
should this judicial decision be brought up by their opponent, the 
student would likely lose points if they were to be the one to first refer 
to this decision as their opponent otherwise may not know about or 
recognize its relevance. In contrast, our budding scientist faced with the 
existence of a similarly obscure peer-reviewed scientific publication that 
arguably would refute their thesis, would need to include this 
publication in the presentation at the risk of being perceived as 
incompetent for not finding the publication, or unethical for not 
discussing it. 
Senator Edmund Muskie is reputed to have asked for a one-handed 
scientist when chairing a Senate hearing at which the head of an NAS 
Committee presented with equal emphasis the scientific findings that 
on the one hand supported or on the other hand opposed allowing 
supersonic transport to fly over the United States.32 While frustrating 
to Senator Muskie, the NAS Committee head, in using both hands, was 
keeping to the norms of science. 
Approaching the scientific literature as something to be 
manipulated to support an advocacy position is also at play in the 
 
32. Ira Flatow, Truth, Deception, and the Myth of the One-Handed Scientist, 
THE HUMANIST (Dec. 11, 2012), https://thehumanist.com/
magazine/november-december-2012/features/truth-deception-and-the-
myth-of-the-one-handed-scientist [https://perma.cc/9TWL-TBBF]. In 
teaching potential expert scientific witnesses, I point out that the 
standard formulation of “the whole truth and nothing but the truth,” in 
a legal proceeding really means the “whole truth and nothing but the 
truth as defined by the specific questions asked by the lawyers.” 
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proposed “Transparency in Regulatory Science” rule which is discussed 
in Section IIIB below. 
E. Going Up Alleys to See if They Are Blind vs. Don’t Ask Questions 
Unless You Know the Answer 
Scientific research has been characterized as “going up alleys to see 
if the alleys are blind.”33 In contrast, lawyers are taught that in a 
courtroom it is not wise to ask questions whose answers may be 
unforeseen.34 
The Trump Administration’s reluctance to ask questions about the 
impacts of climate change is well documented.35 One can characterize 
some of the attempts of climate deniers as intentionally going up alleys 
that are known to be blind.36 This follows the playbook of the tobacco 
industry to manufacture doubt.37 Cutting back on climate change 
research at the EPA is particularly problematic, as the appropriate 
 
33. The quote is attributed to Barstow Bates. Research is the Process of 
Going Up Alleys to See if They’re Blind, QUOTE INVESTIGATOR, 
https://quoteinvestigator.com/2016/03/28/alleys/ 
[https://perma.cc/WD2U-6MPU]. 
34. See e.g., Gerry Oginski, On Cross-Examination at Trial Why Don’t You 
Ask a Question If You Don’t Know the Answer to It?, N.Y. MED. 
MALPRACTICE & ACCIDENT TRIAL L., https://www.oginski-
law.com/faqs/on-cross-examination-at-trial-why-don-t-you-ask-a-
question-if-you-don-t-know-the-answer-to-it-.cfm 
[https://perma.cc/LT5H-ZMUC]. 
35. See, e.g., Juliet Ellperin, EPA Now Requires Political Aide’s Sign-off for 
Agency Awards, Grant Applications, WASH. POST (Sept. 4, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/epa-now-requires-political-
aides-sign-off-for-agency-awards-grant-applications/2017/09/04/2fd707a0
-88fd-11e7-a94f-3139abce39f5_story.html [https://perma.cc/9AWC-
QB8A] (noting that John Konkus, an EPA political appointee, was 
reportedly given the job of eliminating EPA funding from all studies 
related to climate change). 
36. For example, deniers of a major role for humans claim that climate change 
is due to naturally occurring temperature cycles or other ongoing 
phenomena related to solar activity which ought to be investigated. See, 
e.g., INT’L CLIMATE SCI. COALITION, 
https://www.climatescienceinternational.org/ [https://perma.cc/FF8G-
VWWZ]. The goal is to inappropriately manufacture doubt about our 
rapidly occurring current anthropogenic climate changes, but the fact is 
that global climate change is occurring far too quickly to be due to natural 
cycles. See, e.g., How is Today’s Warming Different From the Past?, 
NASA EARTH OBSERVATORY (June 3, 2010), 
https://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/features/GlobalWarming/page3.php 
[https://perma.cc/6QPQ-PBXZ]. 
37. See infra Section IV for Scott Pruitt’s attempt to develop a red team, 
blue team approach to evaluating global climate change. A book that 
more generally considers the role of manufacturing doubt is NAOMI 
ORESKES & ERIK M. CONWAY, MERCHANTS OF DOUBT, ch. 1 (Bloomsbury 
Press 2010). 
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focus for the Agency’s research activities should be on answering 
questions asked by the public and by policymakers about the personal 
and community impacts of climate change, an area that in my view has 
not been sufficiently emphasized.38 
I discuss below the EPA’s new rule to “Strengthen Transparency 
in Regulatory Science” as the misapplication of scientific norms that 
are fully appropriate for the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) but 
not to the EPA. It could also more cynically be considered as an 
attempt to limit the availability of science through not allowing peer-
reviewed literature to be considered.39 
1. COVID-19 and NAAQS Standards as an Example of Don’t Ask the 
Question 
More recently, Administrator Wheeler has used the “don’t ask any 
questions” approach to avoid considering the role of the COVID-19 
pandemic in margin of safety considerations for the new particulate and 
ozone standards.40 The NAAQS standard-setting process is a superb 
example of incorporating public health concepts into setting 
regulations. The formulation in the Clean Air Act is that the standard 
should be set to protect public health with an adequate margin of 
safety. 
Almost uniquely among public health bills, Congress has spelled 
out, and the courts affirmed, directions relative to including an 
“adequate margin of safety.”41 Congress appears to have been prescient 
 
38. See Climate Change Research, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/climate-
research [https://perma.cc/GS4V-ZYWU] (detailing EPA’s acceptance of 
the role of studying the health and environmental impact of climate 
change). See also Bernard D. Goldstein & Michael R. Greenberg, Global 
Climate Change and the “So What” Issue: Reversing the Impact of Donald 
Trump, 108 AMER. J. PUB. HEALTH S78 (2018); Nick Watts et al., Health 
and Climate Change: Policy Responses to Protect Public Health, 386 THE 
LANCET 1861 (2015); see generally, Jonathon A. Patz et al., Climate 
Change: Challenges and Opportunities for Global Health, 312 J. AMER. 
MED. ASSN. 1565 (2014). 
39. See infra Section III.B. 
40. Review of the National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate 
Matter, 85 Fed. Reg. 82,684 (Dec. 18, 2020) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. 
pt. 50); Review of the Ozone National Ambient Air Quality Standards, 
49 Fed. Reg. 49,830 (Aug. 14, 2020) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 50). 
41. The term “adequate margin of safety” is used 41 times in EPA’s 65-page 
particulate matter standard federal register document. Subsequent cites 
are to the specific page in EPA’s Federal Register notice promulgating 
standards for particulate matter (see Review of the National Ambient Air 
Quality Standards for Particulate Matter, 85 Fed. Reg.). The cited pages 
also contain citations to key judicial decisions related to the margin of 
safety. I quote from EPA’s Federal Register notice as readers 
appropriately may question whether I have the background to interpret 
court decisions or am interpreting them differently than EPA does. The 
language about the margin of safety in the present Federal Register notice 
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in regards to our current COVID-19 pandemic. It is clearly telling the 
Agency to consider whether there are grounds for greater stringency 
than just the science that CASAC has considered in its 
recommendation. The specific language, as quoted from EPA’s Federal 
Register notice for the NAAQS for particulates, is that the margin of 
safety should: “address uncertainties associated with inconclusive 
scientific and technical information”42 and “provide a reasonable degree 
of protection against hazards that research has not yet identified,”43 and 
that the EPA administrator should set the margin of safety even if “the 
risk is not precisely identified as to nature or degree.”44 Further, the 
Congressional language goes beyond just leaving the decision about the 
margin of safety to the discretion of the Administrator and specifies 
three factors that the Administrator should consider in setting the 
margin of safety: “[i]n addressing the requirement for an adequate 
margin of safety, the EPA considers such factors as the nature and 
severity of the health effects involved, the size of the sensitive 
population(s), and the kind and degree of uncertainties.”45 
Considering these three factors leads to the following conclusions 
about the potential interaction between particulates or ozone and 
COVID-19. “Nature and severity” includes death and debilitating 
disease. The “size of the sensitive population” is at least in the many 
millions. As to “the kind and degree of uncertainties,” we know that 
COVID-19 shares with PM 2.5 and ozone having greater effects in those 
with pre-existing lung and heart disease., and current evidence points 
to COVID-19 causing persistent lung and heart damage, even in 
 
differs little from that of President Reagan’s 1987 particulate standard. 
Revisions to the National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate 
Matter, 52 Fed. Reg. 24,634, at 24,635 (July 1, 1987) (to be codified at 
40 C.F.R. pt. 50). 
42. Review of the National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate 
Matter, 85 Fed. Reg. at 82,686, 82,714. The references given at 82,686 is 
to Lead Industries Ass’n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1154 (D.C. Cir. 1980); 
American Petroleum Institute v. Costle, 665 F.2d at 1186; Coalition of 
Battery Recyclers Ass’n v. EPA, 604 F.3d 613, 617–18 (D.C. Cir. 2010); 
Mississippi v. EPA, 744 F.3d 1334, 1353 (D.C. Cir. 2013). The language 
is similar at 82,714 without the references. 
43. Review of the National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate 
Matter, 85 Fed. Reg. at 82,686, 82,714. The two quotes are coupled 
similarly at 82,686 and 82,714. 
44. Id. at 82,686. The full quote is “Thus, in selecting primary standards that 
include an adequate margin of safety, the Administrator is seeking not 
only to prevent pollution levels that have been demonstrated to be 
harmful but also to prevent lower pollutant levels that may pose an 
unacceptable risk of harm, even if the risk is not precisely identified as to 
nature or degree.” 
45. Id. (citing Lead Industries Ass’n, 647 F.2d at 1161–62; Mississippi, 744 
F.3d at 1353). 
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individuals with milder cases.46 As a physician with experience in 
pulmonary medicine, I find it almost inconceivable that a virus which 
so viciously attacks the heart and lungs will not make things worse 
when combined with present or past exposure to a pollutant that also 
attacks the heart and lungs, and vice versa. 47 
Further, the job of considering the margin of safety is given to the 
Administrator, not to CASAC.48 CASAC made its recommendation 
before there was knowledge about the pandemic, but Mr. Wheeler’s 
particulate standards were promulgated more than nine months after 
President Trump’s declaration of a pandemic. 
Mr. Wheeler was asked about COVID-19 in a newspaper interview 
and responded by saying that there are uncertainties about the number 
of deaths.49 He is right in terms of the level of scientific proof that 
 
46. For a review of persistent disease following recovery from acute COVID-
19, see Denyse D. Lutchmansingh, et al., A Clinic Blueprint for Post-
Coronavirus Disease, 159 CHEST 2021 949 (2021). A study in Belgium 
of non-hospitalized patients nine months after the pandemic began showed 
persistent respiratory symptoms. Roy Meys et al., Generic and 
Respiratory-Specific Quality of Life in Non-Hospitalized Patients with 
COVID-19, 9 J. CLINICAL MED. 3993 (2020). 
47. Bernard Goldstein, EPA Must Consider COVID-19 In Setting Air 
Pollution Standards, THE HILL (June 28, 2020), 
https://thehill.com/opinion/energy-environment/504908-epa-must-
consider-covid-19-when-setting-air-pollutant-standards 
[https://perma.cc/L4KZ-SVYQ]. Note that when this piece was written 
in June 2020 there was already sufficient X-ray evidence of lung scarring 
to predict longer term effects, so Mr. Wheeler had more than ample time 
to take residual lung damage into account in the margin of safety. There 
is one mention of COVID-19 – as the reason for closing the EPA public 
docket library (at 82,864). Clearly, Mr. Wheeler knows about COVID-19, 
as EPA has used it as a rationale to decrease oversight of potentially-
polluting industries (Susan Bodine, Memorandum: COVID-19 
Implications for EPA’s Enforcement and Compliance Assurance Program. 
March 26, 2020). 
48. Review of the National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate 
Matter, 85 Fed. Reg. at 82,686. 
49. Michel Wilner, At EPA, Coronavirus Disrupts Research and Raises 
Questions about Air Quality Impact, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Aug. 
9, 2020), https://www.post-gazette.com/news/insight/2020/08/09/At-
EPA-coronavirus-disrupts-research-and-raises-questions-over-air-quality-
impact/stories/202008090029 [https://perma.cc/9A5Z-SPP5]; see also 
EPA, EPA RESPONSE TO SIGNIFICANT COMMENTS ON THE PROPOSED 
NATIONAL AMBIENT AIR QUALITY STANDARD FOR PARTICULATE MATTER 
(Apr. 30, 2020), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2020-
12/documents/pm_naaqs_response_to_comments_final.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7R6B-LXJT] (EPA’s official response to comments it 
received about COVID-19 is: “[t]here are many variables related to 
COVID-19 health outcomes, and, as COVID-19 is an emerging disease, 
there are still many unknowns. Understanding the links between air 
pollution exposure and COVID outcomes is a complicated process that 
will take many years. The research in this area is new and emerging . . . ” 
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CASAC would need when it considers the likelihood of adverse effects 
at given pollutant levels.50 But his answer is not at all pertinent to the 
rationale for the Clean Air Act requirement that a NAAQS standard 
have an adequate margin of safety as described above. He could have 
asked EPA scientists, or CASAC,51 or the NAS, or assembled an expert 
committee to look at COVID-19 in relation to the margin of safety for 
the particulate and ozone standards. But he chose the lawyerly 
approach of not asking a question whose answer does not help his 
advocacy position. 
F. Other Differences: Temporal Factors, the Choice of Judge and Jury, 
and the Admissibility of Evidence 
Temporal factors also play a role in the difference between how 
lawyers and scientists act. Sheila Jasanoff, in her carefully considered 
distinction between regulatory science and research science, has 
contrasted the temporal aspects of regulatory deadlines and political 
pressures with the open-ended nature of research science.52 A legal 
process in a court of law, or an effort in a regulatory agency working to 
meet a judicial or Congressional deadline, must be based on information 
available at the time the decision is made. In contrast, a scientist 
operates with the constant recognition that it is likely the truth 
eventually will be known, and that when it is there could be adverse 
career consequences if it turns out that the scientist was wrong. It is 
the rare scientific paper that does not have a temporizing statement 
 
and “[t]he EPA will consider these new studies for inclusion in the air 
quality criteria for the next PM NAAQS review.” The implication of this 
statement is that EPA has not read its own FR notice about what it is to 
consider in setting the standard). 
50. See Paul J. Villeneuve & Mark S. Goldberg, Methodological 
Considerations for Epidemiological Studies of Air Pollution and the SARS 
and COVID-19 Coronavirus Outbreaks, 128 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 1, 11 
(Sept. 2020) (a methodological critique that highly questioned the validity 
of then existing published studies that had suggested an association 
between COVID-19 and air pollution). 
51. Again quoting the language from the FR notice for the new particulate 
standard, EPA notes that beyond advice on the appropriate level for the 
standard, CASAC is given other advisory functions by statute including 
“(i) advise the Administrator of areas in which additional knowledge is 
required to appraise the adequacy and basis of existing, new, or revised 
national ambient air quality standards.” Review of the National Ambient 
Air Quality Standards for Particulate Matter, 85 Fed. Reg. at 82686. Mr. 
Wheeler may not have been willing to bring the issue to CASAC as Mark 
Frampton, a pulmonary physician, who would be by far the most 
knowledgeable CASAC member about the potential interaction between 
COVID-19 and air pollutants, was among the minority of CASAC 
members who argued before the pandemic for a more stringent long-term 
particulate standard. 
52. THE FIFTH BRANCH, supra note 1, at 82. 
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pointing out that more research is needed to confirm the findings.53 This 
leads scientists on consensus committees to try to huddle up with other 
committee scientists, thus facilitating achieving a consensus opinion.54 
Yet another difference which appears to be pertinent to current 
EPA leadership’s activities is that opposing counselors routinely 
maneuver to have a judicial venue or a judge whose legal philosophy is 
consonant with their advocacy position.55 When juries are involved, it 
is also the lawyer’s obligation to do their best to pick jury members 
whose life experiences and viewpoints will likely be favorable to their 
client.56 In contrast, an organization seeking to understand the 
consensus position of the scientific community should pick those with 
the greatest expertise in the pertinent scientific disciplines. When policy 
considerations call for representation of opposing sides, it is the 
responsibility of the organization to ensure that balance occurs. 
Without such balance, a consensus position that reflects the current 
understanding of the scientific community is unlikely. Further, it is 
likely that the taint of bias will affect the credibility of the committee’s 
recommendations. 
Rules of evidence also govern the admissibility of scientific evidence 
into court cases. Switching from the Frye to the Daubert tests at the 
federal level and in many states, has been accompanied by giving the 
judge a larger role in deciding which expert evidence in considered.57 
 
53. That research leads to further research is sufficiently implicit in the 
scientific method that the unqualified statement that more research is 
needed has been banned by the British Medical Journal. Fiona Godlee, 
More research is needed—but what type?, THEBMJ (Aug. 25, 2010), 
https://www.bmj.com/content/341/bmj.c4662 
[https://perma.cc/GMN5-G3XV]. In a website aimed at graduate 
students, a researcher in New Zealand has said that the phrase more 
research is needed “is the final sentiment of an overwhelming proportion 
of journal articles, and is repeated so often at academic conferences that 
I’ve been tempted to sell it on t-shirts.” Anaise Irvine, More Research is 
Needed, THESISLINK (Mar. 29, 2017), https://thesislink.aut.ac.nz/
?p=5179 [https://perma.cc/PX2B-ZDNV]. 
54. See supra note 26. Other reasons for moving toward the middle of the 
curve include the deference we tend to give to experts in other disciplines 
than our own when, as is usual for EPA, the decision is based on science 
from multiple disciplines. Further, the deliberative committee approaches 
that allow discussion of the science tend to lead to consensus. 
55. For a Supreme Court decision on venue shopping related to patent law, 
see TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514 
(2017). 
56. Clarence Darrow, How to Pick a Jury, CLARENCE SEWARD DARROW 
(1936), http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/DAR_
JURY.HTM [https://perma.cc/3BZ2-UNVK]. 
57. See Angelica Cappellino, Daubert vs. Frye: Navigating the Standards of 
Admissibility for Expert Testimony, EXPERT INST. (July 24, 2020), 
https://www.expertinstitute.com/resources/insights/daubert-vs-frye-
navigating-the-standards-of-admissibility-for-expert-
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The earlier Frye test, derived from a Supreme Court decision related to 
the validity of lie detectors, was primarily based on considering whether 
an expert’s testimony was in keeping with the consensus of the scientific 
community.58 In the newer Daubert test, derived from the toxic tort 
issue of whether a commonly prescribed “morning sickness” pill was 
responsible for fetal abnormalities, the focus switched to whether the 
appropriate scientific methodology was used in the scientific literature 
on which the expert opinion was based – that is, how the expert got to 
the opinion.59 This provides more focus on the individual studies, in 
essence leading the judge to be given a much more active role in 
deciding whether science is admissible. The recently promulgated 
“Transparency in Pivotal Science Underlying Significant Regulatory 
Actions and Influential Scientific Information (Transparency Rule),” 
with its wide-ranging and poorly-defined authority given to the EPA 
Administrator to select or deselect individual studies, can be viewed as 
providing a similar gatekeeper role, with the Administrator in the role 
of a not-impartial deciding judge.60 
II. Organizational and Scientific Issues Related to 
the Science/Policy Interface in the EPA 
A. Comparison with Other Federal Agencies: Organizational Issues 
Comparing EPA with other science-based regulatory agencies 
highlights two issues related to the interface between science and policy 
at EPA. One is that the EPA was not founded by an act of Congress. 
The second is its inclusion of an in-house scientific organization at an 
organizational level equivalent to its policy offices. 
 
testimony/#:~:text=Generally%2C%20the%20difference%20between
%20the,list%20of%20factors%20to%20consider [https://perma.cc/76BN-
CHAC]; see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1999); 
and see Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
58. Frye, 293 F. at 1014. 
59. The Federal Rules of Evidence Section 702, derived from the Daubert 
decision and since amended for clarity, states that a qualified expert 
witness may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if: (a) The 
expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the 
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) 
The testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c) The testimony is 
the product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) The expert has 
reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case. FED. 
R. EVID. 702. Each of these four components has words or phrases that 
can be variously defined and applied (e.g., “reliable,” “sufficient,” 
“reliably applied”). 
60. Strengthening Transparency in Pivotal Science Underlying Significant 
Regulatory Actions and Influential Scientific Information, 86 Fed. Reg. 
470 (Jan. 6, 2021) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 30). 
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When it was formed in 1970, the decision that the EPA should have 
a scientific arm may well have been based on inertia. To establish the 
EPA, President Nixon amalgamated existing components of different 
federal agencies.61 When the dust settled, of the 84 sites that were now 
the “property” of the new agency, half were laboratory facilities.62 
Congress did agree to the EPA’s formation and signaled approval of 
the EPA having an in-house science program by funding a new research 
facility in Cincinnati.63 But, in contrast to the FDA, the Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), the Consumer Product 
Safety Commission and other similar agencies, the EPA does not have 
a founding act that in essence provides it a Congressionally-mandated 
mission statement.64 
The evidence that this would have been a bad idea, at least until 
now, comes from an experiment unintentionally devised by Congress 
fifty years ago. The EPA and OSHA were both formed in 1970. The 
EPA began with its own R&D program, while OSHA, as part of the 
Department of Labor, was established with a separate R&D program 
in a different federal agency (The National Institute of Occupational 
Safety and Health, which is part of the Centers for Disease Control in 
the Department of Health and Human Services).65 Having different 
intra-agency, OMB, and congressional oversight and budgetary review 
processes, OSHA and NIOSH sometimes do not appear to be well-
coordinated.66 Early in the EPA’s history, the salience of the argument 
 
61. Special Message from the President to Cong. about Reorganization Plan 
No. 3 of 1970 (July 9, 1970) https://archive.epa.gov/
epa/aboutepa/reorganization-plan-no-3-1970.html 
[https://perma.cc/7CCU-DAB5]. 
62. Dennis C. Williams, Why Are Our Regional Offices and Labs Located 
Where They Are? A Historical Perspective on Siting, EPA HIST. (March 
1993), https://www.epa.gov/history/why-are-our-regional-offices-and-
labs-located-where-they-are-historical-perspective-siting 
[https://perma.cc/9V7U-XYSB]. 
63. Id. Among the founding documents leading to the formation of EPA, I 
can find none that specifically raised the question of whether EPA should 
have its own science and technology function. 
64. Bernard D. Goldstein, Science and an EPA Mission Statement, 101 ENV’T 
HEALTH PERSP. 466–67 (1993). 
65. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 § 22, 29 U.S.C. 671; About 
the Office of Research and Development (ORD), U.S. ENVTL. PROT. 
AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/aboutepa/about-office-research-and-
development-ord [https://perma.cc/5C35-PX24]. 
66. For example, many of OSHA’s enforceable standards are substantially 
different from the standards formally recommended by NIOSH. As just 
one of many examples, the OSHA enforceable limit for toluene is 200 parts 
per million (ppm; 8 hour average), while NIOSH has recommended that 
the limit should be 100 ppm (10 hour average). See ToxFAQs for Toluene, 
AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES AND DISEASE REGISTRY, 
https://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/Toxfaqs/TF.asp?id=160&tid=29 
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that the EPA’s science could become biased because of internal political 
interference led Congress to direct the formation of scientific advisory 
processes which incorporated the external scientific community, notably 
the Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee (CASAC) as part of the 
1977 Amendments to the Clean Air Act, and the upgrading of the 
Science Advisory Board (SAB) following passage of the EPA Science 
Advisory Board Reform Act of 1978.67 The number of CASAC 
committee members were specified, and the committee was given an 
important role in the activities leading to the setting of National 
Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS). The SAB reform assured 
the committee’s independence in providing advice, including its 
involvement in any major EPA scientific issue.68 If these aspects of the 
EPA were to be dismantled, it might be worth considering removing 
ORD from virtual captivity by the EPA’s political concerns and placing 
it within NIEHS, the Centers for Disease Control, or other 
governmental organizations. 
B. Comparison with Other Federal Agencies: Scientific Issues 
I have chosen to consider the EPA’s new “Transparency Rule,” at 
least in part, as a misunderstanding of the applicability to the EPA of 
the scientific norms that govern how the FDA makes decisions about 
allowing the marketing of clinical interventions. I argue that these FDA 
rules are specific to the FDA and not generalizable to the EPA. The 
FDA, like the EPA, is a complex organization with different types of 
organizations to regulate and a variety of regulatory tools to use. The 
FDA has a strong advisory process, with many major decisions being 
formally recommended by panels of external scientists with a large 
variety of disciplinary expertise.69 One source of confusion, or of 
 
[https://perma.cc/48XB-WE5P]. As EPA Assistant Administrator (AA) 
for the Office of Research and Development, I could fully expect to present 
my budget proposal for the forthcoming year to the same oversight groups 
who would also hear from other EPA AAs who were heading EPA policy 
offices. These oversight groups were within EPA, at the White House 
Office of Management and Budget, and within Congress. I could be certain 
that at every level each of these AAs would be asked whether ORD’s 
current and planned activities were supportive of policy office goals. The 
coordinating role of oversight processes is less likely to occur when the 
organizations report so differently within the federal structure. The 
geographical separation between OSHA and NIOSH also precludes the 
informal “elevator conversations” that at EPA are effective in 
communicating and coordinating science and policy, although OSHA and 
NIOSH have worked hard to successfully bridge the distance between 
Washington DC and Morgantown, WV. 
67. Environmental Research, Development, and Demonstration 
Authorization Act (ERDDAA). 42 U.S.C. § 4365 (2018). 
68. See 42 U.S.C. § 7409(d)(2) (2018). 
69. The language specifying the expertise that is desired for the core of FDA 
Science Advisory Board of 21 voting members lists 19 different areas 
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intentional obfuscation,70 has led to the generalization of transparency 
processes which are appropriate to one part of FDA’s mission, that of 
approving new drugs, but not to EPA’s mission of setting standards to 
protect human health. 
A longstanding desire of those opposed to the EPA’s use of science 
for regulations that affect the fossil fuel industry is to require that the 
EPA only rely on studies for which all of the data are available for 
anyone to reanalyze.71 This began over twenty years ago and has 
proceeded with many iterations and many names, including “secret 
science,” “The HONEST Act,” and most recently “Transparency in 
Regulatory Science.”72 Wagner has given a good summary of the history 
of this endeavor, and has pointed out that it is analogous to efforts 
under Daubert to disqualify science in tort proceedings.73 
Scientific transparency sounds good. The FDA has led a major push 
for transparency in studies presented for regulatory agency decisions. 
This makes sense for the FDA. The approach required for investigating 
a new therapeutic agent is a randomized double-blind study in which 
neither the volunteer patient nor the physician knows whether the 
 
pertinent to FDA. Rakesh Raghuwanshi, Science Board to the Food and 
Drug Administration, FDA (Apr. 23, 2019), 
https://www.fda.gov/advisory-committees/committees-and-meeting-
materials/science-board-food-and-drug-administration 
[https://perma.cc/528F-4NVT]. 
70. While likely to be a misunderstanding for many to whom transparency 
seems a nominal good, in November 2019, David Michaels and I concluded 
that the obfuscation is likely to be intentional on the part of EPA 
Administrator Wheeler. See David Michaels & Bernard D. Goldstein, How 
EPA Director Andrew Wheeler is Using Scientific Transparency as a 
Weapon, SALON (Nov. 25, 2019), https://www.salon.com/
2019/11/24/how-epa-director-andrew-wheeler-is-using-scientific-
transparency-as-a-weapon/ [https://perma.cc/L7LA-HU7D]. 
71. See infra note 72. 
72. See e.g., Bernard Goldstein, Why the EPA’s Secret Science Proposal 
Alarms Public Health Experts, THE CONVERSATION (May 18, 2018), 
http://theconversation.com/why-the-epas-secret-science-proposal-
alarms-public-health-experts-96000 [https://perma.cc/XYN8-BWR4]. 
See also Strengthening Transparency or Silencing Science? The Future of 
Science in EPA Rulemaking: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Sci., 
Space, & Tech., 116th Cong. 47 (2019) (statement of Linda Birnbaum, 
former NIEHS Director); GOLDMAN & DOMINICI, supra note 6; Joel 
Schwartz, “Transparency” as Mask? The EPA’s Proposed Rule on 
Scientific Data, 379 NEW ENG. J. MED 1496, 1497 (2018); particularly 
informative is a study showing how little anyone wants the underlying 
data for EPA regulations by Lynn R. Goldman & Ellen K. Silbergeld, 
Assuring Access to Data for Chemical Evaluations, 121 ENVTL. HEALTH 
PERSP. 149 (2013). 
73. WAGNER, supra note 1, at 101–02. 
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patient is receiving the drug or the placebo.74 This approach is ethically 
justified because the volunteer who suffers from the disease may benefit 
if assigned to receive the drug rather than the placebo, but would not 
be ethical for comparing the adverse effects of a pollutant with that of 
a placebo.75 Further, the circumstances of the drug trial, including the 
cost and the proprietary nature of the drug, usually limit major clinical 
trials to at most a few relatively expensive large studies funded and 
performed under the direction of the company.76 Past experience with 
misunderstood or misrepresented drug studies has justified the FDA 
and similar agencies in other countries to require complete 
transparency, including advanced public notice of the study.77 In 
contrast, for environmental health studies only in rare circumstances 
can one ethically ask a volunteer to be exposed to a potentially harmful 
pollutant to test its toxicity.78 
 
74. Michael D. Green, et al., Reference Guide on Epidemiology, REFERENCE 
MANUAL ON SCI. EVIDENCE 555–56 (National Academies Press 3d ed., 
2011). 
75. Two issues are at play here. It is difficult to imagine that a researcher 
could enlist enough volunteers willing to be exposed to a potentially toxic 
chemical for a randomized double-blind study to have enough statistical 
power to find out if the chemical produces an adverse effect. Secondly, on 
ethical grounds, an Institutional Review Board (IRB), whose approval is 
required for any human study, would be highly unlikely to approve the 
study in the absence of any potential benefit to the volunteer. 
76. The value and challenges of randomized clinical trials are evident to 
anyone following news accounts of the development of treatments and 
vaccines for COVID-19. For vaccine development from 1998–2009, 
Pronker et al. have estimated a market entry success rate of 6% at an 
average investment cost of $200-900 million. Esther S. Pronker, et al., 
Risk in Vaccine Research and Development Quantified, 8 PLOS ONE 1 
(2013). 
77. To be published in major journals or considered by the FDA, the clinical 
trial is required to be posted in advance on an approved transparent web 
site available to the public. For the decision by the editors of major 
journals not to accept for publication any non-registered manuscript 
describing a clinical trial, see Catherine De Angelis et al., Clinical Trial 
Registration: A Statement from the International Committee of Medical 
Journal Editors. 351 NEW ENG. J. MED., 1250, 1250–51 (2004). For the 
NIH clinical trials registry see ClinicalTrials.gov, U.S. NAT’L LIBR. OF 
MED., https://www.clinicaltrials.gov/ [https://perma.cc/7UGB-Z2JF] 
(providing a database of privately and publicly funded clinical studies 
conducted around the world). The background for this development 
included the perception that drug companies were selective in the studies 
they submitted to the government. 
78. The National Academies of Science, Engineering and Medicine provide a 
brief description of the findings of an NAS Committee asked to review 
controlled human exposure studies. See New Report Finds EPA’s 
Controlled Human Exposure Studies of Air Pollution Are Warranted, 
NAT’L ACADS. PRESS (Mar. 28, 2017), 
https://www.nationalacademies.org/news/2017/03/new-report-finds-
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The inherent inability of environmental epidemiology to achieve the 
gold standard of a randomized double-blind control trial, the greater 
uncertainties related to measuring the exposure of individuals, and the 
usual lack of a one-to-one relationship between a pollutant and a 
disease79 means that there is a much greater likelihood of some 
unforeseen confounding in any one study.80 For example, if a pollutant 
increases the extent of asthma attacks in the general population by 
twenty percent, this impact may be more than sufficient to trigger EPA 
regulation. But asthma attacks have many causes, including different 
local sources of pollen, personal stress levels, respiratory infections, 
indoor allergens, and other triggers.81 Accordingly, any one study could 
be confounded by variations in other causes of asthma. Without 
randomization to most effectively control for these potential 
confounding factors, the EPA has relied on reviewing the breadth and 
depth of all of the relevant studies, using peer review as a valuable first 
screen. In essence, there is a web of science that must be evaluated for 
informed regulatory decision-making. Not surprisingly, the links in this 
web will be of different strength, depending upon the specifics of the 
study and its relevance to the decision under consideration.82 EPA’s 
 
epas-controlled-human-exposure-studies-of-air-pollution-are-warranted 
[https://perma.cc/MJ8G-ZMPF]. 
79. A rare exception to the general rule that pollutants cause effects that have 
other causes as well is mesothelioma, which serves as a signature disease 
of asbestos exposure. Curtis W. Noonan, Environmental asbestos exposure 
and risk of mesothelioma, 5 ANNALS OF TRANSLATIONAL MED. 234 (2017) 
(“Asbestos exposure is the only established risk factor known to be 
causally related to mesothelioma.”). Another important difference is that 
in the drug trial the dose of the agent to the individual is relatively rigidly 
controlled. In contrast, studies of exposure to environmental agents often 
require extrapolation from indirect measurements, such as regional 
pollutant levels, or estimates based on whether a community is upwind or 
downwind from an overturned tanker car. See Exposure Assessment Tools 
by Approaches – Indirect Estimation, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/
expobox/exposure-assessment-tools-approaches-indirect-estimation-
scenario-evaluation [https://perma.cc/4YR5-RS8P]. 
80. See GREEN, supra note 74, at 563–64. 
81. Common Asthma Triggers, CDC (Aug. 21, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/
asthma/triggers.html [https://perma.cc/QJF3-5L2X]. 
82. For example, consider two studies showing a similar positive relation 
between summertime ozone levels and emergency room visits for asthma 
in different communities. In one study, community pollen levels are 
available and the investigators have shown that the pollen levels are 
unrelated to asthma incidence. In the second, community pollen counts 
are not available. Although a weaker study because it cannot evaluate 
pollen as a possible confounder, the second study strengthens the overall 
web of science supporting the reported association (e.g., the observed 
association between ozone and asthma attacks could have been negative 
rather than positive). The concern is that an EPA administrator would 
discard the first study and focus on the weakness in the second study. 
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revised transparency proposal, allowing the Administrator to pick and 
choose among the studies to be considered, raises the possibility of 
preferential choice of studies aimed at biasing the outcome.83 
 In interpreting the web of studies, one must also consider 
biological plausibility. The EPA almost uniformly considers biological 
plausibility in its scientific analyses underlying regulation.84 For 
example, there was much doubt about initial findings of cardiovascular 
effects of particulates reported in epidemiological and animal toxicology 
studies until mechanistic pathways between lung and heart were 
clarified. 85 
Perhaps the real goal of the “transparency” proposal is to 
sufficiently narrow the number of published papers considered in the 
EPA’s scientific analysis so that the technique of discrediting the 
opponent’s science by “corpuscularization” can come into play. This 
term, coined by Thomas McGarity, refers to the goal of discrediting 
every one of the scientific papers used by opposing advocates by finding 
at least a small blemish in each, thereby claiming that each paper 
 
83. The EPA SAB, when it finally was allowed to weigh in on the full 
proposal, expressed concern about the definitional issues. Michael 
Honeycutt, Subject: Science Advisory Board (SAB) Consideration of the 
Scientific and Technical Basis of EPA’s Proposed Rule Titled 
Strengthening Transparency in Regulatory Science, OFF. OF THE ADMIN. 
SCI. ADVISORY BOARD (Apr. 24, 2020), https://yosemite.epa.gov/
sab/sabproduct.nsf/LookupWebReportsLastMonthBOARD/2DB3986BB
8390B308525855800630FCB/$File/EPA-SAB-20-005.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6NXF-SQEC]. See my discussion of the specific 
example of the chemical industry’s attacks on a significant paper 
supporting formaldehyde as a cause of human leukemia. Industry obtained 
the raw data and hired consultants to find alleged blemishes but never 
sought to repeat the study in another exposed population. See Bernard 
Goldstein, Presentation to the Joint Hearing of the Subcommittee on 
Investigations & Oversight and the Subcommittee on Environment of the 
House Committee on Science, Space and Technology, ENV’T PROTECTION 
NETWORK 5–6 (Mar. 27, 2019), https://www.environmental
protectionnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/IRIS-Testimony-
March-27-2019-Goldstein.pdf; Bernard Goldstein, The HONEST Act is 
Actually Dishonest and Will Hurt the EPA, THE HILL (Apr. 20, 2017), 
https://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/energy-environment/329671-the-
honest-act-is-actually-dishonest-and-will-hurt-the 
[https://perma.cc/X7LR-JXRL]. 
84. Each of the Integrated Scientific Assessments for NAAQS air pollutants 
has a section on biological plausibility, as do many other EPA scientific 
analyses. See EPA, INTEGRATED SCIENCE ASSESSMENT FOR PARTICULAR 
MATTER 17 (2019). 
85. Id. at 6 (discussing the role of PM2.5 in causing cardiovascular effects). 
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should be totally disregarded from consideration by the judge or jury, 
rather than considered as part of a reinforcing web of science.86 
C. The Status of ORD Within EPA 
Under President Trump the status of ORD within the EPA was 
degraded. This is the first time that a president failed to nominate 
anyone for Senate confirmation as the EPA Assistant Administrator for 
Research and Development.87 Having the science arm of the EPA 
headed by someone nominated by the President and confirmed by the 
Senate puts that individual at the same level as the heads of the 
program offices (e.g., Office of Water; Office of Air and Radiation). 
Instead, current ORD leadership has a well-respected internal EPA 
scientist, Dr. Jennifer Orme-Zavaleta as Principal Deputy Assistant 
Administrator and Acting Chief Science Advisor. However, 
Administrator Pruitt created a new position, Deputy ORD Assistant 
Administrator for Science Policy. Pruitt originally chose Richard 
Yamada, PhD, who as an assistant professor had a reasonably well-
respected scientific publication record in applied mathematics and 
genetics. Yamada became involved in scientific policy after serving on 
the staff of the House Science, Space and Technology Committee.88 
Administrator Wheeler replaced Yamada with David Dunlap, a 
chemical engineer who has long been involved in environmental 
consulting.89 Dunlap’s recent service as director of environmental affairs 
 
86. See Thomas O. McGarity, Science in the Regulatory Process: On the 
Prospect of “Daubertizing” Judicial Review of Risk Assessment, 66 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS 155 (2003). 
87. See How to Rebuild the US Environmental Protection Agency, 
NATURE.COM: EDITORIALS (Dec. 16, 2020), https://www.nature.com/
articles/d41586-020-03539-z [https://perma.cc/586C-A5RZ]. Senate 
Republicans blocked President Obama’s choice, Dr. Thomas Burke, to 
head ORD. Senate Republicans Threaten to Block Confirmation of EPA 
Research Chief. SCIENCE MAG. (June 2015), 
https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2015/06/senate-republicans-threaten-
block-confirmation-epa-research-chief [https://perma.cc/BH2L-GHLJ]. 
88. The committee was chaired by Lamar Smith (R, Texas), a climate denier, 
who repetitively led the committee to propose laws related to 
transparency and EPA science advisory processes. Michael Hiltzik, 
Column: Good Riddance to Rep. Lamar Smith (R-Texas), the Most 
Obnoxious Climate Change Denier in Congress. LOS ANGELES TIMES 
(Nov. 3, 2017). https://www.latimes.com/business/hiltzik/la-fi-hiltzik-
lamar-smith-20171103-story.html [https://perma.cc/W2H9-3YUD]. 
Yamada’s activities on this committee presumably led to his choice for 
this new ORD Deputy Administrator for Science Policy. Scott Waldman, 
Meet the Man Helping EPA to Reshape Science, E&E NEWS (May 23, 
2018), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060082467 
[https://perma.cc/9B7B-WC2B]. 
89. Brandi Buchman, EPA Names Former Koch Industries Figure Chief of 
Research, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. (Oct. 1, 2018), 
https://www.courthousenews.com/epa-names-former-koch-industries-
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for Koch Industries is not mentioned in his biography on EPA’s 
website,90 nor does it appear that he has published in the scientific or 
technical literature. Dunlap’s job is described as representing “the 
Administrator and Deputy Administrator at various task force, panel, 
and committees on science and operational program activities related 
to the development of Agency science policies and regulations.”91 In 
other words, rather than a scientist or engineer confirmed by the U.S. 
Senate, an advocate chosen by the EPA Administrator was the interface 
between ORD’s scientific and technical staff and EPA’s regulatory 
decision processes. 
III. Achieving Scientific Consensus 
Frustration by stakeholders at how scientific evidence is 
incorporated into legal and regulatory processes, and not just those of 
the EPA, has been a virtual constant throughout the EPA’s existence 
and has led to proposals for change.92 The following brief review of 
consensus processes is aimed at serving as a background to the 
discussion of the changes proposed or made by the Trump 
administration. 
 
figure-chief-of-research/ [https://perma.cc/LT96-J8EB]; Annie Snider, 
Koch Alumnus at EPA Worked on Toxic Chemical Despite Recusal Plan, 
POLITICO (Oct. 17, 2019, 10:00 AM), https://www.politico.com/
news/2019/10/17/koch-dunlap-epa-formaldehyde-049060 
[https://perma.cc/WLH6-W8NW]. 
90. Bess Levin, Trump Quietly Planted a Top Koch Official Inside the E.P.A., 
VANITY FAIR (Feb. 5, 2019), https://www.vanityfair.com/
news/2019/02/trump-put-a-koch-official-in-charge-of-americas-drinking-
water [https://perma.cc/7CER-6B7P]. I confirmed Levin’s position that 
the lack of mention of Mr. Dunlap’s prior position at Koch Industries is 
distinctly unusual. The EPA website provides a list of each of its 
Headquarter and Regional Offices; including its leadership at the 
Assistant Administrator (AA), Deputy AA or Regional Administrator 
levels, with in many cases a link to their biographies. On Dec 31, 2020, I 
found 19 biographies of individuals who were not long-term EPA 
employees. With the sole exception of Mr. Dunlap, all of these biographies 
specified their prior position before coming to EPA. EPA appears to have 
omitted Mr. Dunlap’s prior position to obscure the fact that EPA’s 
Deputy Administrator for ORD came from an advocacy position at Koch 
Industries. 
91. PFAS Technical Program, AIR & WASTE MGMT. ASS’N, 
https://www.awma.org/pfastechprogram [https://perma.cc/CU6Y-
9NKX] (including Dunlap’s EPA biography that has since been removed 
from EPA website). 
92. One example of responding to such concerns is an external review of 
EPA’s science commissioned by EPA Administrator William Reilly. It 
includes a favorable review of CASAC’s activities. U.S. ENVTL. 
PROTECTION AGENCY, EPA 600/9-91/050, SAFEGUARDING THE FUTURE: 
CREDIBLE SCIENCE, CREDIBLE DECISIONS (1992). 
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Approaches to obtain the considered opinion of the scientific 
community vary based upon the goals of the process, the legal 
structures in which they take place, the culture of the organizations 
involved, and the breadth and depth of the science to be considered. In 
2004, Russellyn Carruth and I critiqued the scientific review process 
then recently adopted by the World Trade Organization (WTO) to 
assist in a WTO Panel deliberation.93 We noted the importance of 
determining how to fairly choose the experts for a contentious issue; 
pointed out the need to consider the number of experts in relation to 
the breadth of disciplines involved; criticized the WTO for hearing from 
the experts individually rather than having them discuss the issues 
jointly with the WTO panel; and criticized the failure of an iterative 
approach which could clarify the uncertainties in dispute resolution.94 
We recommended changes to move toward a consensus panel.95 These 
are many of the same changes that are needed to repair the damage 
inflicted by the Trump administration on the consensus processes 
developed through decades of trial and error at EPA. Described below 
are a number of consensus processes used by various organizations. 
Perhaps most pertinent to mixing law with science was a proposal 
for a “Science Court” made almost 50 years ago by Alvin Weinberg. He 
noted that many of the science-related issues facing government were, 
in his words, “trans-scientific.” He advocated approaching these 
difficult problems by borrowing standard legal procedures,96 including 
examination and cross-examination of scientists about their findings 
and interpretation. 
Wendy Wagner, in her 2003 review of various attempts to reform 
regulatory science, notes the then-active campaign from those 
concerned with “bad science” to implement a “regulatory Daubert” 
approach.97 Wagner has pointed out that the Information Quality Act, 
the Shelby Amendment, and similar initiatives can be seen as a 
backdoor attempt to bring Daubert to administrative agencies.98 
Another possible means of improving the delivery of informed 
scientific opinion to the law is based on the recognition that, under Rule 
 
93. Russellyn S. Carruth & Bernard D. Goldstein, The Asbestos Case: A 
Comment on the Appointment and Use of Nonpartisan Experts in World 
Trade Organization Dispute Resolution Involving Health Risk, 24 RISK 
ANALYSIS, 471, 471–81 (2004). 
94. Id. 
95. Id. 
96. See Alvin Weinberg, Science and Trans-Science, 10 MINERVA 209 (1972) 
(describing the complexity of issues that Weinberg called trans-science 
might today fit under the heading of “wicked problems” such as 
sustainability and climate change). 
97. WAGNER, supra note 1, at 66–67. 
98. Id. See supra Section III.B. 
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706 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, a federal court judge has the 
authority to bring in their own experts.99 Joe S. Cecil of the Federal 
Judicial Center, working with the National Academies of Science and 
with the American Association for the Advancement of Science has been 
particularly active in advocating for judges to take advantage of this 
opportunity. 100 He found that when judges brought in their own 
experts, in 56 of 58 instances the courts’ rulings were consistent with 
the expert panel’s findings.101 Yet it appears that most judges are not 
comfortable with bringing in their own experts, and I am not aware of 
a rush to do so.102 
From 1977–2013 the U.S. National Institutes of Health (NIH) held 
consensus development conferences primarily on controversial topics 
relevant to clinical decision-making.103 The topics were often of 
particular interest to government agencies who needed to decide 
whether to pay for a specific treatment.104 An Institute of Medicine 
review of the NIH Consensus Development conference program was 
generally positive.105 However, Itzhak Jacoby, who was an advocate of 
using science courts for difficult regulatory decisions, and was involved 
in the development of the NIH Consensus Conference program, became 
 
99. Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer, in an introductory chapter to the 
Federal Judicial Center’s Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence, 
provides an insightful overview of the issues facing judges in making 
decisions in the face of conflicting scientific experts. He is cautiously 
positive about judicial appointment of experts to serve the court. Stephen 
Breyer, Introduction, in NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL, REFERENCE MANUAL ON 
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 7–9 (3rd ed. 2011). 
100. Joe S. Cecil & Thomas E. Willging, Accepting Daubert’s Invitation: 
Defining a Role for Court-Appointed Experts in Assessing Scientific 
Validity, 43 EMORY L.J. 995, 995 (1994). 
101. Id. at 1041. 
102. For why judges are uncomfortable choosing their own experts, see JOE S. 
CECIL & THOMAS E. WILLGING, COURT-APPOINTED EXPERTS: DEFINING 
THE ROLE OF EXPERTS APPOINTED UNDER FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 
706, 4–5 (1993). 
103. For an overview of this program when it was active, see COUNCIL ON 
HEALTH CARE TECH. INST. OF MED., MED. TECH. ASSESSMENT DIRECTORY 
(1988), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK218312/pdf/Bookshelf_NBK
218312.pdf [https://perma.cc/VT9Q-U4US]. 
104. Retirement of the National Institutes of Health Consensus Development 
Program, NAT’L INST. HEALTH, https://consensus.nih.gov/ (stating that 
the reason for discontinuation of these conferences was that they were 
created during a time when few other organizations were providing 
evidence reviews. But that there were now “many other organizations that 
conduct such reviews, including other federal agencies, academic 
institutions, and private organizations.”). 
105. CONSENSUS DEVELOPMENT AT THE NIH: IMPROVING THE PROGRAM, COMM. 
OF INST. OF MED. COUNCIL ON HEALTH CARE TECH. 3 (1990). 
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disillusioned and criticized the NIH program because it was 
insufficiently confrontational and did not include cross-examination of 
the expert witnesses.106 
A somewhat bizarre example of an attempt to modify the consensus 
processes of science by building on a procedural approach useful in 
another context, but irrelevant to the EPA, was Scott Pruitt’s advocacy 
of the “Red Team, Blue Team” approach to test the validity of global 
climate change. Originally developed by the military and now heavily 
used in cybersecurity, the red team is charged with testing the potential 
limitations of the defenses of an entity while the blue team evaluates 
the ability of the entity to stop, or at least limit, the effectiveness of 
the attack secretly chosen by the blue team.107 As envisioned by Pruitt, 
the public debate would give equal credence to climate deniers, who 
represent a very small percentage of the scientific community.108 John 
Kelly, a former Marine Corps General who was then Trump’s White 
House Chief of Staff, put an end to this proposal.109 
 
106. See Itzhak Jacoby, Consensus Development at NIH: What Went Wrong, 
4 RISK 133 (1993); see generally Itzhak Jacoby, The Consensus 
Development Program of the National Institutes of Health, 1(2) INT’L J. 
TECH. ASSESSMENT IN HEALTH CARE 419, 420 (1985) (describing the 
creation of the Consensus Development Program). An earlier review was 
positive about process changes that had been made by the NIH to achieve 
consensus but raised continuing concerns about selection of questions and 
panelists. See generally Paul M. Wortman et al., Do Consensus 
Conferences Work? A Process Evaluation of the NIH Consensus 
Development Program, 13 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L., 469 (1988). 
107. For example, Microsoft has red teams of hackers and blue teams of those 
whose goal is to find and shore up potential vulnerabilities to hacking. 
Kris Evans, Red vs Blue. Inside the World of the Elite Hacker and Those 
Trying to Stop Him, MICROSOFT INDUSTRY BLOGS – U.K. (May 17, 2016), 
https://cloudblogs.microsoft.com/industry-blog/en-gb/financial-
services/2016/05/17/red-vs-blue/ [https://perma.cc/FP2M-DBC8]. 
108. See Naomi Oreskes, Scientific Consensus on Climate Change, 306 SCIENCE 
1686 (Dec. 3, 2004); see also Vital Signs of the Planet, NASA GLOB. 
CLIMATE CHANGE (2019), https://climate.nasa.gov/scientific-consensus/ 
[https://perma.cc/MV54-MBAJ] (2019 statement by the US National 
Aeronautic and Space Administration that 97% of climate scientists agree 
that anthropogenic global climate change is occurring). 
109. Lisa Friedman & Julie Hirschfeld Davis. The E.P.A. Chief Wanted a 
Climate Science Debate. Trump’s Chief of Staff Stopped Him, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/09/climate/pruitt-
red-team-climate-debate-kelly.html [https://perma.cc/49AU-9TY6]. It 
appears that Administrator Weaver, who was Deputy Administrator 
under Pruitt, seemed to believe that the double-blind studies performed 
at FDA are equivalent to a red team, blue team debate. Bernard 
Goldstein, How EPA Administrator Completely Misinterprets Science, 
THE HILL (June 20, 2019), https://thehill.com/opinion/energy-
environment/449465-how-epa-administrator-wheeler-completely-
misinterprets-science [https://perma.cc/S85L-XCRL]. 
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Perhaps the most recognized and copied consensus approach 
globally is that of the U.S. National Academies of Science (NAS). The 
NAS has been heavily involved in providing committees, workshops, 
roundtables, or other activities, often specified by Congress, that have 
reviewed and facilitated EPA activities.110 
Central to the internal NAS process is selection of committee 
members whose expertise covers the breadth of the charge to the 
committee.111 The NAS staff solicits nominations and carefully reviews 
the applicants. 112 The potential for bias, or the appearance of bias, is 
of primary concern, including previous opinions of the candidate on the 
subject matter before the committee, and sources of funding that may 
be interpreted by others as bias.113 For obvious reasons, the absence of 
a taint of bias is particularly necessary for the choice of Committee 
chair. On certain subjects, the NAS may occasionally decide that it 
would be best to balance the committee composition in terms of 
potential bias, such as by including both a scientist working for an 
environmental group and another for industry, but all members are 
abjured from approaching the topic as a representative of an 
organization.114 Before being publicly released, the draft committee 
report is carefully scrutinized within NAS and by external reviewers 
chosen by NAS from its elected members.115 
The Health Effects Institute (HEI) provides an example that is 
particularly pertinent to the issue of the credibility of EPA’s air 
pollution health effects research. It was formed in 1980 in response to 
controversies concerning the scientific basis for EPA’s NAAQS 
standards.116 HEI is a non-profit organization with an independent 
Board of Directors. For its core activities, it is funded equally by the 
 
110. Insertion of Environmental Protection Agency into the search engine of 
the National Academies Press finds 3,496 publications resulting from NAS 
activities. See Search Results for EPA, THE NAT’L ACADS., 
https://www.nap.edu/search/?rpp=20&ft=1&term=EPA 
[https://perma.cc/3UBU-7XPG] (last visited Feb. 18, 2021). 
111. The processes are described in National Academies of Science, Engineering 
and Medicine. See Our Study Process, NAT’L ACADS., 
https://www.nationalacademies.org/about/our-study-process 
[https://perma.cc/QTG2-MYMZ]. 
112. Id. 
113. Id. See generally, Conflict of Interest Policies and Procedures, NAT’L 
ACADS. OF SCI., ENG’G AND MED., https://www.nationalacademies.org/
about/institutionai-policies-and-procedures/conflict-of-interest-policies-
and-procedures [https://perma.cc/9ZPL-PSQT]. 
114. NAT’L ACADS., supra note 28, at 6. 
115. See generally NAT’L ACADS., supra note 111. 
116. Terry J. Keating, Lessons from the Recent History of the Health Effects 
Institute, 26 SCI., TECH. & HUM. VALUES 409 (2001). 
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EPA and the automotive industry.117 Neither the EPA nor industry 
participates in the choice of the Board or of the members of HEI’s 
Research or Review Committees. The members of the Research 
Committee, who select the research proposals to be funded, are chosen 
and make their decisions based on processes similar to those of NIH, 
and the members of the Review Committee, who provide a written 
critical review of each of the completed projects, are chosen and make 
their decisions using processes similar to those of NAS. 118 HEI has been 
favorably reviewed by social scientists as an example of a successful 
boundary organization, one that is accountable to two adversarial 
organizations.119 
A. What Changed Under the Trump Administration? 
Previously, the EPA’s processes for CASAC, SAB, and many other 
external scientific advisory committees generally adhered to the 
processes of NAS. A synopsis of what was changed at the EPA under 
the Trump Administration includes: 
(1) The committee selection process moved from being primarily 
performed by professional EPA staff, who focused on the needed 
expertise, to a process dominated by the Administrator and other 
EPA political appointees.120 One requirement created by Mr. 
Pruitt was that CASAC have an increased number of individuals 
working for state or local agencies rather than the one such 
individual required by Congress.121 Unlikely to be coincidental, of 
 
117. For a fuller description of the organization see About HEIs, HEALTH 
EFFECTS INST., https://www.healtheffects.org/about 
[https://perma.cc/PQ83-FBYB]. 
118. Conflicts of Interest Policies, HEALTH EFFECTS INST. (Nov. 2017), 
https://www.healtheffects.org/about/conflict-of-interest-policies 
[https://perma.cc/HQW4-8D9Q. 
119. See David Guston, Boundary Organizations in Environmental Policy and 
Science: An Introduction, 26 SCI., TECH. & HUMAN VALUES 399, 403 
(2001); see also THE FIFTH BRANCH, supra note 1, at 209–16. Its 
reputation for scientific objectivity has led HEI to be asked to develop 
approaches to contentious scientific issues, such as the potential adverse 
health impact of unconventional shale gas drilling, which it has done 
through developing an affiliated organization. See HEI-Energy, HEALTH 
EFFECTS INST., https://www.healtheffects.org/unconventional-oil-
natural-gas [https://perma.cc/L74J-QXJ8]. 
120. Christopher S. Zarba, The Assault Against Science Continues at the EPA, 
N. Y. TIMES (Nov. 24, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/11/14/opinion/environment-trump-epa-science.html 
[https://perma.cc/JA5B-8Q7E]. 
121. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(d)(2) specifies that 
of the total seven members, one should be a member of the National 
Academy of Sciences, one should be a physician, and one person should 
represent state air pollution control agencies. As CASAC also opines on 
the secondary NAAQS standards aimed mostly at protecting ecosystems, 
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the seven current CASAC members, the four from state or local 
agencies all worked in organizations that reported to Republican 
administrations. 
(2) The choice of the chair of CASAC, Louis Anthony Cox, is a 
recognized consultant statistician who has what, at best, might 
be called a minority view of the use of epidemiological evidence 
for causation in public health matters.122 He is a consultant for 
the fossil fuel industry and has expressed his opinion supporting 
the industry on key issues related to health effects of air 
pollutants, including a Wall Street Journal opinion piece.123 In my 
opinion, for him to chair CASAC clearly violated the norm for 
any scientific consensus committee.124 
(3) A primary issue for assembling a consensus committee is that 
all disciplines relevant to interpreting the pertinent science be 
represented. Despite epidemiology being the central discipline for 
interpreting the data relevant to standard setting for most air 
pollutants, no one with primary expertise in epidemiology was 
chosen for the seven-member CASAC committee. Wheeler is 
quoted as saying that the group of CASAC members had “a 
diverse set of skills in fields like toxicology, engineering, medicine, 
ecology and atmospheric science.” Epidemiology is notably absent 
from this list. 125 
 
it has become traditional that an ecologist is one of the seven CASAC 
members. To the best of my recollection there previously has never been 
more than one member from a state or local agency. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7409(d)(2) (2018). 
122. John Balmes, Don’t Let a Killer Pollutant Loose, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 14, 
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/14/opinion/air-pollution-
trump.html?partner=IFTTT [https://perma.cc/BC6N-Q2DD]; 
GOLDMAN & DOMINICI, supra note 6. 
123. Tony Cox, The EPA’s Next Economic Chokehold, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 1, 
2015, 7:19 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-epas-next-big-
economic-chokehold-1441149571 [https://perma.cc/G943-PQEE]. 
124. This opinion is based on my experience chairing CASAC and about a 
dozen NAS committees, many requested by the EPA. I have chaired other 
EPA and federal, state and local scientific consensus committees, as well 
as for the Health Effects Institute, the World Health Organization, the 
United Nations Environmental Program and the Scientific Committee on 
Problems of the Environment. 
125. Dino Grandoni & Juliet Elperin, EPA Scraps Pair of Air Pollution Panels, 
WASH. POST (Oct. 13, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/energy-
environment/2018/10/14/epa-scraps-pair-air-pollution-science-panels/ 
[https://perma.cc/X4PB-5HJM]. The only medical professional on 
CASAC is Mark Frampton, MD, a pulmonary physician who would be 
expected to have at least modest training and working experience in 
epidemiology. He submitted a minority opinion arguing that the evidence 
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(4) Because there is such a breadth of disciplines involved in 
evaluating the health effects of NAAQS pollutants, it has long 
been recognized that pollutant-specific CASAC subcommittees 
are also needed.126 The particulate subcommittee had already 
begun its deliberations when it was peremptorily fired and plans 
for the ozone subcommittee were aborted.127 
(5) After receiving much criticism about the discharge of the 
subcommittees from CASAC members and others, the 
Administrator’s office chose individual external scientists to, in 
essence, be made available for CASAC members to question – 
once again without a deliberative process.128 
 
required a more stringent annual particulate standard rather than EPA’s 
proposal to retain the existing standard. 
126. I served on two such subcommittees in the early 1980s. These 
subcommittees have tended to increase in size, due to the increasing 
number and breadth of relevant published papers and due to advances in 
environmental epidemiology and in exposure science. 
127. Id at 126. EPA’s rationale was the need to speed up the NAAQS review 
process to meet the five year statutory deadline. See Memorandum from 
E. Scott Pruitt, Administrator, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 
to Assistant Administrators; Back-to-Basics Processes for Reviewing 
National Ambient Air Quality Standards, U.S. ENV’TL PROT. AGENCY 
(May 9, 2018) https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2018-
05/documents/image2018-05-09-173219.pdf [https://perma.cc/ES5V-
HXGU]. This is specious. If that were the true reason then it would make 
sense to begin with the health-based standard that was most out of date, 
that of carbon monoxide. See NAAQS Table, EPA, 
https://www.epa.gov/criteria-air-pollutants/naaqs-table 
[https://perma.cc/JA33-Z7B8]. My conclusion is that the reason Mr. 
Pruitt and Mr. Wheeler began with ozone and particulates and short 
circuited the process is that these were the two NAAQS pollutants for 
which accumulating science frightened the fossil fuel industry into 
believing that the standards might be made more stringent unless acted 
on in the first term of the Trump Administration. See also Gretchen 
Goldman, et al., We Put Science Back into EPA Air Pollution Standards, 
But . . . , SCI. AM.: OBSERVATIONS (Apr. 15, 2020), 
https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/we-put-science-back-
into-epa-air-pollution-standards-but/ [https://perma.cc/NE5R-MDJC]. 
The particulate standard subcommittee continued to meet on their own 
and, in contrast to CASAC, recommended more stringent standards. 
Independent Particulate Review Panel, The Need for a Tighter 
Particulate Matter Air Quality Standard. 360NEW ENGL. J. MEDICINE 680-
683 (Aug. 13, 2020). 
128. For a succinct overview of the many changes made in the CASAC process 
see H. Christopher Frey, A Rush to Judgment: The Trump Administration 
is Taking Science Out of Air Quality Standards, THE CONVERSATION (as 
A comprehensive review can be found in a letter to the Chair of Casac: 
H. Christopher Frey, et al. Letter to CASAC from former members of 
2009–2014 CASAC Ozone Review Panel, Nov. 26, 2018, 
https://yosemite.epa.gov/sab/
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(6) The SAB was not consulted about the wisdom of excluding 
scientists who receive EPA grants from advisory processes, or 
issues related to changing the CASAC processes described above. 
(7) For the proposed transparency rule, EPA leadership initially 
only gave SAB the task of recommending a way to deal with 
technical issues related to meeting personal privacy concerns.129 
They did not ask SAB for advice on whether the proposal was a 
good idea, or even whether there was a problem requiring this 
drastic new approach. This is equivalent to treating SAB as a 
mechanic whose job is to fix a flat tire, but not asking for advice 
on whether this was the appropriate destination or the route to 
be traveling.130 
(8) The SAB did hold a hearing after the EPA published a 
Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Transparency 
in Regulatory Science. The SAB pointed out numerous problems 
that needed to be corrected, including lack of clear definitions of 
terms.131 
(9) EPA’s transparency proposal alters the selection of scientific 
studies to be considered in ways that remain unclear and appears 
 
sabproduct.nsf/0AC9E8672B0CA54985258351005BE54F/$File/Ozone+L
etter+181126+Submitted-rev2.pdf [https://perma.cc/J6PX-BXBZ]. 
Gretchen Goldman, et al., We Put Science Back into EPA Air Pollution 
Standards, But . . . , SCI. AM.: OBSERVATIONS (Apr. 15, 2020), See also H. 
Christopher Frey, EPA decides to reject the latest science, endanger 
public health and ignore the law by keeping an outdated fine particle air 
pollution standard, THE CONVERSATION (May 1, 2020), 
https://theconversation.com/epa-decides-to-reject-the-latest-science-
endanger-public-health-and-ignore-the-law-by-keeping-an-outdated-fine-
particle-air-pollution-standard-136226 [https://perma.cc/YH49-AFG3]. 
129. The subject line from the letter of Sept. 30, 2019 from Michael Honeycutt, 
Chair of SAB to Andrew Wheeler clearly states the narrow subject. 
Michael Honeycutt, Subject: Consultation on Mechanisms for Secure 
Access to Personally Identifying Information (PII) and Confidential 
Business Information (CBI) Under the Proposed Rule, Strengthening 
Transparency in Regulatory Science, OFF. OF THE ADMIN. SCI. ADVISORY 
BOARD (Sept. 30, 2019), https://yosemite.epa.gov/sab/sabproduct.nsf/
41042C652229CA398525848500595458/$File/EPA-SAB-19-005.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/X2EG-Z4XF]. 
130. See Wendy E. Wagner & Rena Steinzor, A Real, Not Faux, Transparency 
Proposal for Regulatory Science, THE REG. REV. (July 31, 2018), 
https://www.theregreview.org/2018/07/31/wagner-steinzor-real-not-
faux-transparency-proposal/ [https://perma.cc/Z6M8-ZWXH] (pointing 
out the lack of a problem statement as a central failing for all of the EPA 
proposed changes in their advisory processes). 
131. Honeycutt, supra note 83. 
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to provide the Administrator, as the judge, with a major role in 
deciding which studies are applicable to the regulatory issue.132 
(10) At their meeting concerning the data privacy issues in the 
transparency proposal, much to the evident surprise of the SAB 
members, SAB members were told to put their individual 
comments in writing and submit them to EPA with no further 
committee deliberations. This approach allows supporters of 
EPA’s transparency proposal to pick and choose from among 
these individual comments, which again is contradictory to a 
deliberative consensus process.133 But it would be in keeping with 
a lawyer summing up their case in front of a judge or jury. 
The transparency proposal provides another particularly glaring 
example of the failure to ask a question – in this case whether the 
proposal can feasibly be carried out. Proponents of the approach 
embodied in EPA’s proposal have had many years to find out whether 
anyone but industry and their consultants would turn over their 
working data to the EPA. 
Before a study involving human subjects can be performed it must 
be approved by the organization’s Institutional Review Board (IRB). 
For any already published study, or a new study for which it was 
considered likely that the data would be pertinent to EPA’s regulatory 
activities, the investigators would need to get approval from the IRB 
to release the data to EPA. 
Briefly, the key unanswered questions are:134 
 
132. See discussion of Daubert rule infra Part II.F. 
133. The Chair of the SAB, Michael Honeycutt, in the first sentence of the 
third paragraph of his September 30, 2019 letter to Andrew Wheeler 
summarizing the SAB response, pointedly states “No consensus report is 
provided to the EPA because no consensus advice is given.” Honeycutt, 
supra note 129. 
134. The data, in italics, come from my sampling of references cited by EPA 
in its own cardiovascular health effects chapter of the Particulate Matter 
Integrated Scientific Assessment. The standard way of deciding what 
influences a decision in both science and law is to look at the references 
cited. Even under the vague definitions given by EPA, pivotal science 
would be cited by EPA in scientific documents underpinning decisions. I 
sampled the 34-page reference section of Chapter 6, Cardiovascular 
Effects, of the Integrated Scientific Assessment for Particulate Matter in 
EPA, INTEGRATED SCIENCE ASSESSMENT FOR PARTICULAR MATTER 331–
344 (2019). The sample was randomized by choosing to review the first 
and last reference on each page – in essence randomization by page break. 
This provided 68 references. I excluded seven studies for which the data 
were likely to be already available to the EPA as they were by EPA 
investigators, or were multi-author reviews with no new data by 
organizations (e.g., American Heart Association), and an HEI Review 
Committee report - which left 61 studies. In considering the number of 
institutions that might be involved in permitting the data to be shared, I 
lumped together multiple institutions of the same organization, e.g., a 
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(1) Would the author or co-authors of EPA-relevant papers want 
to turn over their data? 
(2) If so, would the IRB require unanimous consent of all co-
authors? (average number of co-authors per paper cited by EPA 
in my sample was 9.9). 
(3) To protect itself from potential scandal which could harm its 
ability to recruit subjects for any clinical studies, would the 
institution in which the study was performed insist on making its 
own rules related to turning over study data? 
(4) What about the large majority of studies with multiple 
institutions involved? (average of 4.2 institutions per paper in my 
sample). Would they all need to agree? Would each IRB or 
institution have their own rules? 
(5) Who would pay for any de-identification required by IRB or 
institutional rules? 
(6) Would IRBs refuse to consider turning data over to EPA 
because of environmental justice issues? IRBs have the power to 
disapprove activities that inherently can have a biased 
outcome.135 Would the fact that industry has more money to 
reanalyze studies than does a potentially affected disadvantaged 
community convince IRBs not to permit the data to be turned 
over to EPA? 
(7) In my sample of EPA-referenced publications, a large 
percentage of EPA’s cited references came from countries outside 
of the U.S. (Only 26 of the 61 papers were solely from the U.S.; 
17 had U.S. and non-U.S. institutions listed for their authors; and 
18 had solely non-U.S. institutions). In many countries, including 
particularly in the EU, there are more stringent privacy rules than 
in the U.S. – and California is now more stringent than the rest 
of the U.S. Will this pose difficulties in obtaining the data for 
secondary analyses required in EPA’s proposal?136 Would non-
 
study that had authors from the Harvard School of Public Health, 
Harvard Medical School and a Harvard-affiliated hospital were counted 
as just one organization rather than three. 
135. For example, a study comparing performance on a standardized 
intelligence test of males versus females in which one gender was 
disproportionately selected from community colleges and the other from 
Ivy League universities. 
136. Deven McGraw, a private industry lawyer, speaking at a 2019 NAS 
Workshop on “Virtual Clinical Trials”; Alper et al., Virtual Clinical 
Trials, NAT’L ACADS. OF SCI. 51 (2019), https://www.nap.edu/
catalog/25502/virtual-clinical-trials-challenges-and-opportunities-
proceedings-of-a-workshop [https://perma.cc/S72P-KNSC], was quoted 
by the NAS Workshop rapporteurs as stating that new developments in 
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U.S. scientists agree to subject themselves to potentially hostile 
re-analysis when this is not required by their own country to base 
its regulatory decisions? When there are scientists from multiple 
institutions involved, it is not unusual for IRBs to defer to those 
from other reputable locations. Would EU IRBs be willing to 
defer to the U.S., or California IRBs to other states? 
(8) What about HEI Review Committee products which EPA is 
partially funding?137 Would the reviewers be restricted in their 
influential analyses to cite only to studies for which raw data were 
available? If not, then how can EPA continue to cite these HEI 
analyses in their regulatory documents? 
(9) Am I right in believing there are few if any academic scientists 
who, even if sympathetic to the idea of transparency in 
considering scientific issues among their colleagues, would 
welcome what is highly likely to be hostile industry consultant 
reanalysis that will just divert the academic scientist’s time in 
having to respond? 138 
 
privacy laws, such as in California and the EU “set a higher bar for data 
to be ‘de-identified,’” and that this is particularly of concern “for onward 
secondary uses, such as replication of results and reanalysis.” (emphasis 
added). Note my careful language in ascribing this quote to the NAS 
workshop rapporteurs. Misleadingly, EPA in its Supplemental Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking on Scientific Transparency repetitively cited out of 
context language from an NAS Workshop on Principles and Obstacles for 
Sharing Data from Environmental Health Research, Workshop Summary 
that made it seem as if their proposed approach had NAS support. In 
contrast to committee reports, NAS workshop reports routinely contain a 
disclaimer that the information within the document represent individual 
opinions “and are not necessarily endorsed or verified by the (NAS) and 
should not be construed as reflecting any group consensus”. (See Bernard 
D. Goldstein; Comments on Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
on Science Transparency; Docket # EPA-HQ-OA-2018-0259; May 18, 
2020, https://www.environmentalprotectionnetwork.org/wp-content/
uploads/2020/05/Comments-on-Supplementary-Notice-of-Proposed-
Rulemaking-on-Science-Transparency-Final.docx-2.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/P2VT-QP93]). The failure to attribute the quotes from 
the NAS workshop to Lynn Goldman was further evidence that EPA was 
being intentionally misleading as Goldman had been emphatic in her 
opposition to the transparency in science initiative, including testimony 
to the SAB and a publication in a scientific journal. GOLDMAN & 
SILBERGELD, supra note 72. 
137. For description of HEI and its relation to EPA, see supra notes 119–21. 
138. EPA avoided providing an estimate of how many existing studies would 
fall under its requirement for full disclosure of underlying data and models 
to be considered in rule-making. Perhaps indicative of the intended impact 
is a statement in the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) analysis of the 
failed congressional bill, the HONEST Act of 2017, on which the EPA 
transparency proposal was based. “EPA officials have explained to CBO 
that . . . [their] approach to implementing the legislation would 
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There is an obvious approach to answering these questions. Just 
ask. Survey the scientific community. Ask the SAB for a thorough 
analysis. Or the questions could have been posed to IRB directors, or 
VPs for Research at major universities,139 or to samples of experts in 
the scientific community contributing to EPA’s decision making. 
Notably, these questions should have been posed to the NAS, which 
has been particularly active on data privacy issues. Putting “Date 
Privacy” into the National Academy Press search engine came up with 
723 titles. 
A final question: will the web of environmental health science 
underlying the EPA’s regulations be destroyed because almost no peer-
reviewed studies will be available for analysis? 
Conclusion 
Thanks largely to the election results and to the probing questions 
of Case Western reviewers and the comments of colleagues, I greatly 
revised the conclusions of this paper to focus on where to go from here. 
From the beginning of the Trump administration it has been clear that 
the scientific basis of EPA’s many positive environmental achievements 
were at risk. 140 These fears were not understated. Some of what I 
describe is the bending or breaking of the laws mandating the 
involvement of CASAC and the SAB in facilitating a robust scientific 
basis for EPA’s regulatory activities. To the extent that they are not 
changed by the incoming Biden Administration, the staying power of 
many but not all of the alterations will depend on court decisions. 
But I believe more important than arguably violating the law, the 
EPA under the Trump administration has changed the norms that have 
evolved at the EPA in the last half century. As just one example, 
allowing a consensus committee considering a controversial issue to be 
chaired by a known advocate of one extreme is not specifically forbidden 
by the laws establishing EPA advisory processes. Nor am I aware that 
 
significantly reduce the number of studies that the agency relies on when 
issuing or proposing covered actions for the first few years following 
enactment of the legislation.” U.S. CONG. BUDGET OFF., COST EST.: H.R. 
1430, HONEST AND OPEN NEW EPA SCIENCE TREATMENT (HONEST) ACT 
OF 2017 (2017). 
139. I cannot imagine that my university’s Vice Chancellor for Research, with 
$500 million of annual NIH funding, would risk an inadvertent disclosure 
event that could decrease the likelihood of patients volunteering for future 
clinical research (nor would reassurance of an infallible confidentiality 
process from either the University of Pittsburgh faculty member or a U.S. 
government agency likely affect the Vice Chancellor’s decision). 
140. Jonathan M. Samet et al., The Trump Administration and the 
Environment – Heed the Science, 376 NEW ENG. J. MED 1182–83, 1186 
(2017); David Guston et. al., Endangering the Health of All: Destroying a 
Half Century of Health Leadership Along With America’s Environment, 
110 AMER. J. PUB. HEALTH 284–85 (2020). 
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the value of having an unbiased CASAC chair has been considered in 
judicial reviews. But, along with many other of the changes, it is a norm 
that is central to eliciting the consensus position of the scientific 
community. 
I began this paper with a description of the norms governing 
neighborhood basketball. Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt, in their 
book “How Democracies Die,” point out examples of where democracies 
have failed despite having seemingly appropriate constitutional 
protections, a failing which they attribute to the loss of policy norms. 
Their prescient New York Times op ed written after the election but 
before Trump took office, contains a similar use of street basketball as 
a metaphor: “[l]ike a pickup basketball game without a referee, 
democracies work best when unwritten rules of the game, known and 
respected by all players, ensure a minimum of civility and cooperation. 
Norms serve as the soft guardrails of democracy, preventing political 
competition from spiraling into a chaotic, no-holds-barred conflict.”141 
Norms also serve as the guardrails protecting the scientific basis of 
EPA’s regulations. But EPA leadership under Donald Trump has 
taught us that these guardrails need strengthening. One approach 
would be by adding adherence to consensus processes to the laws 
governing EPA’s advisory committees. Just as lessons learned from the 
Trump administration may lead to developments of further laws 
governing transition of Executive Branch power, the public availability 
of candidates’ tax information, or the process for confirming Supreme 
Court Justices, the norms governing scientific consensus processes can 
be further codified. For example, to the specific Congressional language 
in the Clean Air Act about the composition of CASAC could be added 
statements that the Chair of CASAC must be free of the taint of bias. 
Such language conceivably would have prevented the choice of the chair 
chosen by Administrator Pruitt, or at least given greater weight to the 
court arguments of those looking to overturn the recent particulate and 
ozone NAAQS standards. Amendments to ERDAA could state that the 
choice of EPA’s external advisory committee members and their 
deliberative processes should generally conform to the consensus 
processes used by the National Academies of Science or similar 
organizations. 
Note that I have chosen my words carefully to avoid asking for 
imposition of a one-size-fits-all legal requirement for achieving scientific 
consensus. What I hope for is congressional language and judicial 
 
141. Steven Levitsky & Daniel Ziblatt, Is Donald Trump a Threat to 
Democracy?, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/
2016/12/16/opinion/sunday/is-donald-trump-a-threat-to-
democracy.html [https://perma.cc/245G-MBK3]. The authors have 
expanded on their thesis in a book describing how democratic governance 
has been lost in various countries around the world. Science is hardly 
mentioned. See generally STEVEN LEVITSKY & DANIEL ZIBLATT, HOW 
DEMOCRACIES DIE (2018). 
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decisions that strongly inhibit the substitution of advocacy for 
consensus, that facilitate the use of processes that achieve the strong 
scientific base needed by EPA, and other science-based regulatory 
agencies, to achieve the mission given them by the American public. 
The standard governmental approach to scientific issues that are 
unfamiliar to most elected leaders is to establish a commission that 
would report their findings and recommendations. This would be 
welcome, as would asking the NAS to look at the issue. Ideally this 
commission would be asked for by Congress to whom its report would 
be given. At the least, it should be established by the new EPA 
leadership as an early signal to the internal and external environmental 
science communities of their recognition of the importance of the issue. 
EPA can of course do much internally to change how science has 
been distorted, such as restoring previous processes for the selection of 
advisory committee members and their deliberation. 
Another way for the new administration to signal their intention to 
restore EPA’s scientific norms will be to give priority to the early 
nomination of a highly respected scientist to head EPA’s Office of 
Research and Development, and to be willing to fight for that 
individual’s confirmation by the Senate.142 
There is so much that the new team at the EPA will need to do on 
the regulatory side that I am not optimistic that reversion to the 
baseline scientific processes will occur quickly and am concerned that 
quick fixes may lose sight of what the Trump administration has taught 
us about the vulnerability of scientific norms to those who have made 
their policy decisions in advance. It would be wise not to relax defense 
of science at the EPA just because Trump was not re-elected. His 
return, or the election of a president with similar anti-science and anti-
environmental beliefs, is far from impossible. Further, the potential 
threat to the EPA’s science-based regulatory approaches does not come 
from just one side of the political spectrum. Those on the left include 
many who are post-modernists, who would deconstruct science by 
arguing that reality cannot be proven, and that scientific truth does not 
exist. When they have their turn, and it is likely that sooner or later 
that they will, conservatives may greatly regret having provided the 
template for the long-term destruction of EPA’s scientific consensus 
processes. 
I certainly do not advocate changing the essential differences 
between lawyers and scientists. But I do advocate that we understand 
and credit these differences. As we each participate in the process 
toward achieving the common goal of effective science-based regulatory 
 
142. The incoming EPA leadership of a new administration usually focuses on 
policy issues. Not surprisingly, the head of ORD has usually been among 
the last to be nominated. See Bernard D. Goldstein, EPA at 40: 
Reflections on the Office of Research and Development, 21 DUKE ENV’T 
L. & POL’Y F. 295, 297 n. 5 (2010). 
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activities, we need to acknowledge that different parts of the process 
need to play by different local rules. So as a final recommendation let 
me suggest that a major lesson of the Trump administration for the 
scientific community is that we need to work harder to educate our 
government colleagues, as well as policy makers and the general public, 
about the value of adhering to the norms of science. 
